Anne Landman's Daily Documents

Ann Landman's Daily Documents




  • 01/03/12 'Sue the bastards!' (EPA) PM, 1993
      This memo from Thomas Humber of the giant PR firm Burson-Marstellar (B-M) to Ellen Merlo of Philip Morris (PM) Corporate Affairs signals the start of PM's war against the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) after EPA pronounced secondhand smoke a group A carcinogen. Humber emphasizes how PM needs to discredit the EPA, portray the agency as corrupt, encourage other businesses to oppose EPA, and cast EPA as an agency under siege. Humber tells Merlo PM needs to sue EPA ("Sue the bastards!") as a way to help the industry regain credibility, encourage other companies to fight EPA, and "delay or cloud" other legal actions against the company . . . The memo reveals the awesome power that major public relations firms wield in defining issues and shaping the American political landscape. Humber boasts how, using front groups "Citizens for a Sound Economy" and the "Institute for Regulatory Policy," B-M arranged a symposium where the keynote speaker was the vice-president of the U.S., then assured that the media coverage generated by the event was dominated by the corporate message of "overregulation." Humber also points out that PM could find allies in ventilation businesses, since they stand to profit from PM's stance that ventilation is the solution to problems caused by secondhand smoke (not smoking bans).
        HVAC/IAQ Business and Groups: We have also previously outlined a potential approach to those businesses and groups whose economic interests would be furthered by the adoption of policies and regulations centered on total IAQ solutions rather than source control
  • 01/02/28 BAT: 'We really need something for people to die of.' BAT, Nov 20, 1978
      This document, from British American Tobacco [Campbell Johnson LTD], discusses how the industry should handle the increasing onslaught of anti-smoking sentiment worldwide, and suggests that the tobacco industry should band together to respond to these threats uniformly:
        The industry's response needs, in consequence, to have many facets, but to be balanced and co-ordinated, and, above all, to be unanimous....
      One chilling passage mentions the "social cost" issue, and offers an argument in favor of smoking that the industry acknowledges it could never use publicly :
        ...with a general lengthening of the expectation of life we really need something for people to die of. In substitution for the effects of war, poverty and starvation, cancer, as the disease of the rich, developed countries, may have some predestined part to play. The argument is obviously not one that the tobacco industry could use publicly. But its weight, as a psychological factor in perpetuating people's taste for smoking as an enjoyable if risky habit, should not be under-estimated...
      The document also discusses threats that other drugs, like marijuana, pose to the industry.

  • 01/02/26 Smoking Deaths Save Money BAT, Sep 1, 1994
      The following article saying that smoking deaths save governments money was published in the Canadian Newspaper, the Ottowa Citizen, in September 1994. A copy of the report on which this article is based (by economist Jean Pierre Vidal) can be found at: http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/batco/html/2200/2269/otherpages/allpages.html A report commissioned by Imperial Tobacco says tobacco-related deaths are an economic advantage to Canadians because cigarettes kill people off before they become a burden to the health-Care system. Previously, the tobacco giant always denied any link between cigarettes and death.

  • 01/02/22BAT: 'Competition from Cannabis, Glue Sniffing, Heroin'
      This document, written by D.E. Creighton of the British American Tobacco Co, states that tobacco products could expect "competition from Cannabis, glue-sniffing and possibly hard drugs--heroin and cocaine," and immediately after that, "We must find a way to appeal to the young."
        9. Additional contraints on delivery to include Cyanide, Acreolin, Acetaldehyde, Heavy Metals, Nitrosamies, Nitric Oxide and benzopyrene.10. Nicotine classified as a scheduled poison and sold "on prescription only" to registered users. . . High on the list of consumer needs is nicotine, which I believe to be the main motivator and sustainer of smoking behavior. . . high on the list of product requirements is an adequate level of nicotine to sustain the smoking habit. We have tried the low delivery product route with limited success. This might be because the nicotine in such products is below the pharmacological threshold of effectiveness. Smokers have dissappointed us in that they have chosen not to smoke twice as many 10mg cigarettes if they changed frm 20 mg products. Thus in order to reinforce the primary pleasures of smoking, I have proposed to make it easier for smokers to take what they want from a cigarette which might well have a low delivery when smoked by machine which overcomes current legal constraints to enhance the sensations from the first few puffs.

  • 01/02/18 RJR: Seeking 'Replacement Smokers' RJR, Jan 1, 1989
      This R.J. Reynolds document from 1989 refers to young people as "the only source of replacement smokers." It acknowledges the importance of young people to the future of tobacco industry profits. . . It also reveals that younger smokers are important to the industry's future growth because they both exhibit strong brand loyalty (as many smokers do) and because young people increase their smoking rates as they age:
        The value of FUBYAS [first usual brand younger adult smokers] compounds over time due to extreme brand loyalty and rate per day increases. . . Rate per day increases 30% between ages 18 and 35.
      This statement is particularly interesting in light of tobacco industry's long-time argument that cigarettes aren't addictive because smokers don't show tolerance for nicotine. Tolerance, or increasing the amount of a drug required for to achieve a "high," is a hallmark criteria defining substance addiction. The document also reveals RJR's admiration for the Jack Daniels Whiskey and Budweiser Beer ad campaigns, and considered them models for going after young people. They admired how Budweiser beer "went to work on younger adults," and noted that "the payoff was big." Clearly young people are corporate America's battleground, and especially so for the alcohol and nicotine industries. How many parents know that these corporations are drooling over young people this way? How can a line truly be drawn in an ad campaign between appealing to a sixteen year old and an 18 year old?

  • 01/02/16 PM on the Narcotic Effect of Nicotine PM, May 24, 1972
      People use cigarettes for the narcotic effect derived from the nicotine, according to this internal memo from the director of Philip Morris' consumer research department. It says:
        A widely held theory holds that most people smoke for the narcotic effect (relaxing, sedative) that comes from the nicotine. The "taste" comes from the "tar" (particulate matter) delivery. Although more people talk about "taste," it is likely that greater numbers smoke for the narcotic value that comes from the nicotine.
      Philip Morris' was also aware (long ago) of the link between nicotine use and marijuana use:
        ...This ties in with the information we have from focus group sessions and other sources that suggest that Kool is considered to be good for 'after marijuana' to maintain the 'high' or for mixing with marijuana, or 'instead.'

  • 01/02/15 Potential Threats to Cigarettes BAT, Mar 19, 1976
      In a fascinating discussion, this British-American Tobacco (BAT) document considers future product developments that may threaten sales of cigarettes.
        Nearly ten years ago, a French paper ... discussed numerous plants which might replace tobacco. The only material which has received a lot of attention is marijuana... In the illicit use of marijuana, relatively large doses of the active principal are involved. If the use of such drugs was legalised, one avenue for exploitation would be the augmentation of cigarettes with near sub-liminal levels of the drug.
      BAT also noted that the link between smoking and disease has not deterred most people from smoking. More of a threat to sales than the spectre of disease, they say, is the "increasing tendency to portray smoking as socially undesirable." To combat this threat, they speculate that public relations will be more effective than science:
        ... Taking a long-term view, there is a danger in the current trend of lower and lower cigarette deliveries - i.e. the smoker will be weaned away from the habit....if the nicotine delivery is reduced below a threshold 'satisfaction' level, then surely smokers will question more readily why they are indulging in an expensive habit.
      But most chilling is the notion that they would be threatened if people could find an effective way to control their own brain activity without benefit of drugs:
        ...smoking (largely via nicotine) may assist people to control the level of activity in the brain to a desired level. Other means of such control represent, therefore, a rival to the cigarette. There is an increasing amount of evidence ... that subjects can control their levels of brain activity, without recourse to drugs, if they are given information on the level of brain activity (biofeedback)....such techniques might be used by anti-smoking clinics.
      And last but not least is a statement both acknowledging smoke toxicity and speculating that the company could benefit because it presents them with opportunities for "cigarette designs which offer the image of 'health reassurance.' " :
        ...Looking further down the road, the possibility exists that, as inhalation tests are developed and accepted, then filters might offer a selective means of controlling smoke toxicity...Well before that date, however, opportunities exist for filter and cigarette designs which offer the image of "health re-assurance."...

  • 01/02/14 Targeting Cigarettes at African Americans RJR, Dec 2, 1977
      This R.J. Reynolds document shows that RJR had an interest in targeting African Americans for their products. Here a marketing specialist recommends that RJR consider designing a cigarette just for this ethnic group:
        RJR's business among Blacks is underdeveloped.... Further, given their strong preference for menthol flavor, we probably need to devote more attention to Blacks than before in the development of our marketing plans...In fact, I even feel that a project designed to develop a cigarette for Blacks may be a viable business proposition.
      The marketing company also noted that the incidence of smoking was dropping among caucasians but not among African-Americans, their interpretation of this being that it was a good thing, since it assured the industry of a solid cigarette market among African Americans.

  • 01/02/13 Philip Morris ETS Strategy, 1990 PM, May 7, 1990
      This environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) strategy document by Philip Morris' public relations firm Burson Marsteller reveals how Philip Morris and its PR flack perceived the ETS issue and how they developed "accommodation" as a strategy to deflect it in the 1990s. There are many pivotal lessons for advocates in this document, specifically that 1) the "...social acceptability [of smoking] is ultimately the bedrock upon which the industry's survival depends," thus accellerating the increase in the social unacceptability of smoking will help diminish the industry's future, 2) As long as we fight the tobacco industry on the issue of health--and not allow the industry to co-opt it into an argument of "free choice" or "rights of smokers" we will win, as per the following quote:
        Equally, [these figures] reveal the source of the power of the anti-smokers as long as they can fight the cigarette wars on a battlefield of health....The industry stands somewhat flat-footed in response since it questions the fundamental promise (ie the existence of the health problem) -- a stance which puts it in conflict with the weight of public opinion.
        ...the annoyance issue is more than a health concern...The annoyance issue is as dangerous and perhaps even more dangerous than misperceptions of the health impacts of ETS. If government officials, business managers or restaurant owners feel that they want to ban smoking for health reasons, the scientific data can be mustered to show that such a ban serves no health purpose. But, as has been discovered in the battle for airline smoking, as long as the decision-maker can fall back on a "comfort" or "customer preference" argument, it doesn't matter what the science says. It becomes a question of social harmony and good customer relations...
      5) We should expose Philip Morris' "accommodation" program as a strategy the tobacco industry designed purely to benefit itself, not smokers, as per the following quote:
        Accommodation must be perceived to be for smokers, not for the tobacco industry. If smokers are not visible carriers of the accommodation message, it will lack credibility...
      There are many more lessons to be learned from this document.

  • 01/02/12 Marlboro Man: Losing his Cool? PM, Mar 2, 1992
      Joe Camel had the Marlboro Man worried. After all, the Camel was young, hip, urban, cool,phallic-looking and had no work ethic. The Marlboro Man on the other hand, was tough, severe, serious, rural, older, and delayed his gratification. Joe was selling lots of cigarettes to young people. In the tobacco industry's war to win the hearts of impressionable, rebellious young people (who, according to this document, themselves had no work ethic) the Camel was winning. Thus, industry advertising experts recommended that Philip Morris re-make the Marlboro man into a looser, cooler guy. Have him smile and wave, they recommended, have him show his backside, appear in "Cosmo" magazine -- in short, make him less "Clint Eastwood" and more "Bruce Willis. . . Oh, and by the way, this document confirms that the Camel's nose was a phallic symbol.
      • WHY [THE CAMEL IS] EFFECTIVE WITH 18-24 SEGMENT:
      • Blatant sexuality without responsibility
      • Nose - phallic symbol
      • cigarette instrument of pleasure
      • women as sex objects
      • Identify with the rebelliousness of the Camel
      • Between child and fully responsible adult...
      • The Marlboro Man can have whomever he wants because he is at the top of the dominance hierarchy... ...Target those magazines (e.g., Playboy, Cosmopolitan) where he could be pictured with a woman... ...Show his backside and/or tipping his hat to a lady

  • 01/02/10 Tax Increases, Teen Smoking and Beetles PM, Sep 3, 1987
      This insightful Philip Morris (PM) memo discusses how the company should handle a significant excise tax increase on cigarettes. Of course the answer was to pass it on to customers, but the astonishing revelation is that PM executives knew fully well--in 1987 (and no doubt to this day)--that raising taxes on cigarettes (or a price increase in general) is a proven means of keeping teens from starting to smoke. This was something Philip Morris clearly considered a detriment (despite current PM rhetoric of not wanting kids to smoke):
        Last time, of course, we increased prices five times between February of 1982 and January of 1983.....and this fact was not lost on consumers....the 1982-83 round of price increases caused two million adults to quit smoking and prevented 600,000 teenagers from starting to smoke. Those teenagers are now 18-21 years old, and since about 70 percent of 18-21 year olds and 35 percent of older smokers smoke a PM brand, this means that 700,000 of those adult quitters had been PM smokers and 420,000 of the non-starters would have been PM smokers. Thus, if Harris is right, we were hit disproportionately hard. We don't need to have that happen again.
      This document also reveals that people are regularly smoking worm/beetle larvae in their cigarettes. The writer suggests that the company urge their smokers to stock up on cigarettes before the tax increase, but also that the company urge smokers to refrigerate their cigarette supply under the guise of "preserving their freshness." In reality, it's to keep beetles from emerging from the tobacco

  • 01/02/9 Free-basing Nicotine: State of the Art RJR, Oct 2, 1973
      Determined to find out why their brands were doing so poorly compared to the others, RJR chemically "deconstructed" Marlboro cigarettes with the aim of finding out just how they were different. RJR soon discovered that Philip Morris (PM) had made a "deliberate and controlled" chemical change in thesmoke of their cigarettes. PM was altering the smoke pH by adding ammonia to the tobacco, which made the smoke more alkaline.Why? Because in a more alkaline atmosphere, more of the nicotine "...occurs in 'free' form, which is volatile, rapidly absorbed by the smoker, and believed to be instantly perceived as nicotine 'kick'." Putting more of the drug into a vapor form that is rapidly taken up by thebody is known as "free-basing" a drug. This paper, marked "SECRET," discusses RJR's discovery of this sales-enhancing chemical change, and how they could mimic the freebasing technique that Philip Morris was using. Now, as the industry calls it, employing "ammonia technology" is state of the art in cigarette manufacturing. In essence, all cigarette companies now freebase nicotine, to give the user a faster, harder "kick" after lighting up. The industry calls it "increasing customer satisfaction." Others view it as markedly increasing the addictiveness of cigarettes.

  • 01/02/08 RJR's Target: Less Educated People RJR, Apr 22, 1985
      As the executive vice president of a marketing company writes to RJR:
        I would like to extend our thanks to you and Jeff for your presentation on 'The Less Educated Smoker'....Clearly those people who attended college but have not graduated are the more meaningful target for us<
      Also notice that the marketing executive plans to use information obtained from a "youth study" to help RJR market Camel cigarettes:
        ...we are currently using the learning from the Youth Study and shall be applying it to upcoming projects on Camel..

  • 01/02/06 'Independent Scientists' Tout Substance Enjoyment Burson Marsteller, Sep 28 , 1993
      In 1993 the joint global tobacco industry (through PR company Burson Marsteller) invented an "independent" group of "eminent" scientists, putting them forth as "apolitical" experts on the topic of how substance use enhances quality of life. Incredibly, they named the group "Associates for Research in Substance Enjoyment," or ARISE. ARISE held press conferences around the world at which they expressed their expert scientific opinion that substance use gives humans pleasure, thus enhances people's quality of life and health. Among the activities they listed as being beneficial were "eating food, chocolate, smoking, drinking tea, coffee and alcohol." The group did not mention that drinking tea and eating chocolate never killed anyone, but smoking has taken the lives of millions. . . ARISE held conferences around the world, released polls and sent video news releases to the media assuring the masses that substance use (including smoking) is pleasurable and harmless. . . Journalists ate the hook. In this January, 1997 Philip Morris memo, the writer bragged that,
        Yolande de la Bigne, a well-known [French] journalist, covered the [ARISE Paris] conference...concluding that 'a piece of chocolate, a glass of wine, a good cigarette, you can go for it. Instead of being obsessed by health, everybody should be obsessed by pleasure which induces good health. Le Parisien also covered the conference in a lengthy feature entitled 'Pleasure is good medicine.'

  • 01/02/05 'Youth Programs Could Reduce Sales...' TI, May 9, 1989
      Here is yet another document describing the real reasons the industry has "youth programs."
        This document is the result of a working session on advertising restrictions held on May 3, 1989. The recommendations were produced to address Strategy III of the Institute's public affairs plan on ad ban issues: . . .Concern: There is some risk that efforts to discourage youth smoking could decrease tobacco sales, both immediately and over the long term. This is true. However, the group agreed that, in the absence of credible industry efforts to address the youth smoking issue, various types of potential legislative and regulatory action would have a much more serious impact upon tobacco sales.
      Thus the tobacco industry opted for the lesser of two evils, adopting "youth programs" being the lesser. Here industry representatives describe being forced into having "youth programs":
        The youth smoking issue puts the industry in a 'damned if you do and damned if you don't' situation. Even the most sincere industry efforts cannot be expected to sway anti-smoking hard-liners, who will merely suspect that the campaign has ulterior motives. However, the potential 'damned if you don't' ramifications are serious enough to warrant actions.
      According to the industry, the goals for their "youth programs" are not to reduce the number of children who become addicted to a deadly product, but rather to:
        Provide ammunition to tobacco allies (legislators and others) to oppose unfair restrictions, Enhance the industry's overall ability to gain and maintain allies, Weaken a key argument of tobacco foes.

  • 01/02/04 Job Openings at PM? PM, Jul 1, 1990
      Philip Morris admires the ingenuity ofpeople in the anti-tobacco movement and would like to hire them when they get bored with the movement, according to this speech...
        This may surprise you, but I would like to conclude these remarks by expressing my respect and admiration for the leaders of the anti-tobacco movement, or at least for those in the background who plot their aggressive strategy. In our business we look for people who succeed in developing new products which capture the imagination of the public. We never cease to be amazed with the ability of the anti-tobacco activists to come up with something new. No sooner does common sense destroy one of their assertions, than they are into another line of argument...

        We could certainly use such ingenuity at Philip Morris and let me say here and now, we would be glad to receive the resumés of members of the anto-tobacco movement after they become bored with the cigarette and health controversy. Who knows? If they still have a problem with Merit or Parliament, perhaps we could give them a go with Crystal Light or Miracle Whip.

  • 01/01/30 Lorillard, Jan, 1975: Smoking: Self-treatment for Aggression?
      The tobacco industry took note of a number of studies that showed that nicotine reduces aggressive behavior in humans and animals. Hardly daring to consider the notion that their industry could be contributing to society by reducing crime and aggression in the general population, the writer speculates about this "benefit" of cigarettes:
        No one would be so imprudent as to confer some beneficent role upon the cigarette industry in reducing crime or in quieting the raging beast in man, but the persistence with which the suggestion on an inverse relationship between smoking and aggression has laced the literature is such as to call for a concerted examination of the facts.
      The paper calls for a conference to discuss nicotine's role in the reduction of aggression.

  • 01/02/02 PM, Feb 23, 1982: Admissions of a PM Scientist
      Jim Charles, Ph.D., a veteran scientist with PM's Research and Development department, frets about the landlside of public and private experts who are starting to link cigarettes with multiple organ cancers and other diseases. . .
        This company is in trouble. The cigarette industry is in trouble....The anti-smoking forces are out to bury us... Their goal is to destroy the industry and any means to that end is justified (in their opinion)....

        The Surgeon General's press conference was disturbing. For the first time associations between cancers other than the lung and cigarette smoking are being made in an emphatic manner. Associating cigarette smoking with 30% of all cancer deaths should make someone sit up and take notice...

        Let's face the facts:

        1. Cigarette smoke is biologically active.

        A. Nicotine is a potent pharmacological agent. Every toxicologist, physiologist, medical doctor and most chemists know that. It is not a secret.

        B. Cigarette smoke condensate applied to the backs of mice causes tumors.

        C. Hydrogen cyanide is a potent inhibitor of cytochrome oxidase - a crucial enzyme in the energy metabolism of all cells.

        D. Oxides of nitrogen are important in nitrosamine formation. Nitrosamines as a class are potent carcinogens.

        E. Tobacco-specific nonvolatile nitrosamines are present in significant amounts in cigarette smoke.

        F. Acreolin is a potent eye irritant and is very toxic to cells. Acreolin is in cigarette smoke.

        G. Polonium-210 is present in cigarette smoke.

        H. We know very little about the biological activity of sidestream smoke.

        I. We do not know enough about the biological activity of additives which have been in use for a number of years.
      Notice that while Charles at first says that the "scientific basis for the statements" about the effects of secondhand smoke on nonsmokers "is not sound," he admits at the same time that PM "knows very little about the biological activity of sidestream smoke." These confessions were written in 1982 by a top Philip Morris scientist, and were sent to the head of PM's Science and Technology Department. Yet despite this important admission from one of its most dedicated and stalwart scientists, PM continued to advertise and market cigarettes as though they were safe...

  • 01/01/28 'Excellent Study, could be Very Damaging to Business.' PM, Mar 30, 1980: PM
      [A]n important find. It demonstrates how the goal of Philip Morris' scientific affairs department was to find any means possible to dispute the findings of scientific papers that they determined "could be very damaging to our business," even if it was (as in this case) a paper that the department head himself admitted was "an excellent piece of work." The paper being reviewed here by Jim Charles of Philip Morris was by James R. White, Ph.D. and Herman Froeb, M.D. and shows that nonsmokers exposed to secondhand smoke suffer significant damage to the function of their small airways. The finding that bystanders were harmed by their products was of no concern to Charles, though. Rather, it is clear that his sole focus was on finding some way, no matter how small, to criticize and ultimately discredit the paper, and thus minimize the damage such an "excellent report" could cause the tobacco industry.
        I have reviewed the above paper and find it to be an excellent piece of work which could be very damaging to our business. There are several things that can be done to minimize its impactNo matter who we find to rebut the paper, the ultimate response must be in the form of a legitimate criticism of the significance of the data to appear in the New England Journal of Medicine under the name of a recognized medical authority....Other than the above points I can find little to criticize. The authors have put together an excellent paper in my opinion"

  • 01/01/26 Avoiding the Health Issue by Focusing on 'Corporate Responsbility' PM, Nov 23, 1988
      In this 1988 Philip Morris (PM) document, Philip Morris Counsel Gary Long is instructing Charles Wall of PM on how to frame a speech to improve the company's public image while avoiding "the primary issue" . . Notice the out-and-out recommendation to dodge the smoking and health issue and focus instead solely on "corporate responsibility" and the "recognition of the continued necessity of research in the smoking and health area," even though PM already knows what smoking does to health:
        Industry foes are concerned that Philip Morris may use this increasing economic power to attempt to downplay the public debate concerning smoking and health, by lobbying activity, by controlling internal smoking policies of its non-cigarette divisions, by its advertising decisions and by pressure on its suppliers. Perhaps the focus of the speech could be Philip Morris' recognition of the continued necessity for research in the smoking and health area as well as a statement that discussion on the issue is encouraged by the Company.
      Today, PM's "foes" are still concerned with the same issues, particularly that PM is using its economic power to control the debate and pressure media not to carry anti-tobacco ads, and PM is still using the same dodging tactic of focusing on "corporate responsbility."

  • 01/01/25 PM: Lung Disease Causes Smoking PM, May 29, 1974
      In casting about for something else they could point to as the culprit that was causing lung disease in smokers, the tobacco industry came up with some interesting hypotheses. Their "carotene hypothesis" attempted to blame lung cancer on a high intake of dietary carotene. Another view, promoted for some time, was the "Constitutional Hypothesis" which claimed that a genetic defect caused some human beings to "have difficulty adapting to the problems of existence." Thus they claimed that smoking was a substitute for people's normal coping mechanisms (that is, in some lesser strain of people who suffered from being particularly inadaptable):
        Smoking, then, would result not directly from a genetic predisposition, but as a response to the frustrations (flunking tests in school, etc.) which these relatively unadaptable people experience."
      But one of the most bizarre was the "Reverse Hypothesis," in which Philip Morris scientists tried to substantiate the claim that lung disease was a cause of smoking.

  • 01/01/24 RJR on 'Pre-smokers' and 'Learners' RJR, Feb 2, 1973
      Here is one of the absolute worst documents revealing the tobacco industry's marketing to youngsters . . . Claude Teague of RJR's research department muses about how to attract "pre-smokers" or "learners" to smoking in a marketplace where the cannot do so overtly:
        It should be said that we are presently, and I believe unfairly, constrained from directly promoting cigarettes to the youth market... Realistically, if our Company is to survive and prosper, over the long term, we must get our share of the youth market. In my opinion, this will require new brands tailored to the youth market...

        Pre-smokers learn to smoke to identify with and participate in shared experiences of a group of associates. If the majority of one's closest associates smoke cigarettes, then there is strong psychological pressure, particularly on the young person, to identify with the group, follow the crowd...This provides a large incentive to begin smoking...Thus a new brand aimed at the young smoker must somehow become the 'in' brand and its promotion should emphasize togetherness, belonging and group acceptance, while at the same time emphasizing individuality and 'doing one's own thing.'

        C. Self-Image Enhancement - The fragile, developing self-image of the young person needs all of the support and enhancement it can get. Smoking may appear to enhance that self-image in a variety of ways. If one values, for example, an adventurous, sophisticated, adult image, smoking may enhance one's self-image....
      And finally, RJR gives us a dismal reminder at how health education, and even warning labels, can serve to actually drive youngsters TOWARDS smoking:
        The smoking-health controversy does not appear important to the group because, psychologically, at eighteen, one is immortal. Further, if the desire to be daring is part of the motivation to start smoking, the alleged risk of smoking may actually make smoking attractive. Finally, if the 'older' establishment is preaching against smoking, the anti-establishment sentiment discussed above would cause the young to be defiant and smoke. Thus, a new brand aimed at the young group should not in any way be promoted as a "health" brand, and perhaps should carry some implied risk. In this sense, the warning label on the package may be a plus.
      While this may be an older document, the basic premises survive. We can be certain that the industry still remembers such advice from their experts, for they know (as we do) that if young people aren't attracted to smoking, there won't be any smokers!

  • 01/01/23 M: 'Up from the Bombshelter'
      These are the astounding musings of an "industry friendly" attorney who is is trying to convince members of the industry that they need to take decisive action to combat the ever-growing anti-smoking forces. To do this, he proposes that the industry take up arguments common to property rights and expression rights, and says that these concepts can be "succesfully engrafted" onto current law.
        Beyond tobacco farmers, industry workers, and those in allied wholesale, retail, and related groups, tobacco lacks a highly motivated constituency. Many former smokers (and those who want to quit) look forward to prohibition. They bolster their resolve by Alcoholics-Anonymous-like "altruistic" anti-smoking involvement....

  • 01/01/19 PM, Jun 15, 1988: A Voice of Honesty within the Industry
      This document reveals a pivotal moment in 1988 when members of the global tobacco industry came together to talk about the difficulties they faced regarding the issue of envirnmental tobacco smoke (ETS). . . These are privileged and confidential minutes of a joint industry meeting held in London in 1988. Representatives of the European, Japanese, Canadian, the American and United Kingdom tobacco companies were present. . .Of particular interest are the statements of German cigarette industry scientist, Dr Adlkofer, who questioned the industry's creation of it's own "marketable science." In a stunning departure from typical industry plotting, Dr. Adlkofer stated his view that what the industry was really seeking was "good public relations material, not good science." Dr. Adlkofer further said that "real science" would be "essential if the industry was to prevail on the ETS issue." . . Dr. Adlkofer "refused to endorse a situation in which scientific research is guided by public relations needs." . . He urged the industry instead to concentrate on identifying a threshold level for risk of ETS exposure. . . Dr. Boyce of British American Tobacco (BAT) said that the "no threshold" argument would "automatically indict active smoking." Thomas Osdene of Philip Morris suggested that "a threshold level could be set, but that the threshold not be quantified." Another attendee, Mr. Westcott, said that setting such a limit would be "dangerous" because it would provide "a priori proof of causation for anti-smoking advocates,and would "indict active smoking." John Rupp, of the U.S. tobacco industry's law firm Covington and Burling, further went on to say that "the industry should continue to emphasize the lack of substantive proof of causation." To this Adlkofer responded,
        Science cannot propel the industry any further on the ETS issue unless it is able to say that not one person has died from exposure to ETS.
      There was nothing further added in discussion of this landmark statement. . . The rest of the document is full of descriptions of the industry's existing path of global deceit on the ETS issue. . . This entire document is worth a read.

  • 01/01/18 Fire Safe Cigarette Would Cut into Profits PM, 1992
      For many years, advocates have been lobbying for laws that would require the tobacco industry to make cigarettes that go out when left unattended. It has taken decades for the industry to come up with such a product. Why did it take the industry so long? Because such a product would cost the industry money, according to this Philip Morris document.Tactics taken by the industry to avoid producing a fire-safe cigarette included a massive plan to befriend the fire-service community across the United States by giving grants to hundreds of local fire departments across the nation. This was known as "inoculating hostiles" (the Fire Service was deemed a huge potential enemy to the industry on this issue). Another tactic taken was the production "fire safety" programs and materials aimed at convincing the public at large that is was their responsibility, not the smoker's, to be vigilant and protect people against the fire dangers that smokers caused.
        Efforts by anti-smoking groups to mandate a "fire safe" cigarette could destroy the competitiveness of leading brands and increase the cost of manufacturing cigarettes. . . During the plan period, PM-USA will expand coalitions among the fire prevention community and public policy makers to diffuse support of "fire safe" cigarette legislation at the state and federal level as well as build public awareness of fire safety and prevention.

  • 01/01/16 More on Cigarette Contaminants PM, Jul 20, 1994
      Following are some ofthecontaminants in cigarettes that were listed as the sources of customer complaints in just two Philip Morris company documents: Insects ("insect infestation"), The tear tape found at a murder scene, Varnish, "Adhesive-like materials", Ink solvents, "Insect damage", Machine lubricating oils (lubricants that are used in cigarette manufacturing facilities--apparently up to 100 types of lubricants are used) , Pieces of rubber from assembly belts, Blood, Metal powder, Rubber bands, Matchheads, Pieces of wire (consistent with paper clip components), Explosive loads, Glass fibers, Mold

  • 01/01/12 Washington Legal Foundation & Tommy Thompson WLF, May, 1998
      In 1994, Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson (incoming president Bush's nominee to head the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, which oversees the tobacco control functions of federal government) joined the policy advisory board of an organization called the Washington Legal Foundation, or WLF. WLF receives funding from the Philip Morris tobacco company (PM) and in turn WLF defends PM on its issues. In 1998, the WLF ran this extremely inflammatory, pro-tobacco advertisement in several large papers including the New York Times, the Washington Post, the National Journal, the CongressDaily AM, and others. Easily recongizeable in the article are many of the tobacco industry's arguments (freedom of speech, the Bill of Rights, "slippery slope" arguments about enacting "prohibition" as well as emotion-laden phrases like "anti-tobacco zealots"). . . the WLF has also repeatedly sued government agencies that oversee public health functions, like the Food and Drug Administration and the Enivronmental Protection Agency, who they sued over workplace smoking policies. Thompson's close linkage with WLF, an organization which has long proven itself powerfully hostile to tobacco control and which clearly opposes public health measures, should be strongly questioned by senators scrutinizing Thompson as a possible head of agencies overseeing tobacco control efforts in the U.S.. . .
        Let me see if I've got the most recent version of this game straight. Anti-smoking zealots in government seek to simultaneously single out and punish the demonized tobacco industry while continuing to collect billions of dollars in tax revenues from tobacco sales, as they have for decades. . . --The Washington Legal Foundation --'effective advocate of free enterprise'

  • 01/01/10 There's 40% Less Tobacco in a Modern Cigarette Lorillard, May 4, 1983
      ln 1940, a commercial cigarette contained 1300 milligrams (mg) of tobacco by weight, and by the 1980s it contained only 750 mg of tobacco. The author states,
        Thus, a cigarette of the 1980's would contain about 40% less tobacco... than its counterpart of 40 years ago.
      Apparently, early in the 1900s, cigarette makers used just the upper one-fourth of the tobacco leaf. Over the years, though, mechanical threshing created increased waste, and labor costs kept increasing. Eventually, the industry found ways to make use of parts of the tobacco plant that were never initially intended for use, like stems. They developed ways to incorporate stems by making fillers like reconstituted and "puffed" tobacco (puffed tobacco is treated with a gas to expand it). In the long run, these cost-saving measures, combined with the use of additives, have decreased the amount of actual tobacco in a cigarette by fully 40%.

  • 01/01/08 Tobacco Industry Zealotry TI, Dec 11, 1979
      When tobacco industry representatives use their time-worn strategy of portraying members of the anti-tobacco movement as nothing more than a bunch of shrill, over-emotional zealots, pull out this wild speech by Horace Kornegay of the Tobacco Institute. Kornegay gave this speech to theTobacco and Allied Industries Division of the American Jewish Community on December 11, 1979. In the speech, Kornegay ingratiatingly likens attacks on the tobacco industry to the repression experienced by Jews, and likens the tobacco industry's struggle for survival to Jewish historical efforts to
        combat] bigotry and [protect] civil rights...
      He repeatedly invokes passages from "the Jewish Bible." Kornegay refers to federal health advocate Joseph Califano "Ayatollah Califano" and compares anti-tobacco supporters to axe-murderers . . . Kornegay goes on to make "dire" predictions that smoking will eventually be banned on airlines, in Federal buildings, and that the industry would (*gasp!*) have to place tar and nicotine numbers on the packages, and strengthen the health warnings, predicting that these measures will cause the industry great harm. Then, ironically, he goes on to make what we now consider to be a very strong case in favor of policies to eliminate public smoking:
        Consider this: If the pressure of anti-smoking laws and regulation succeeds in stopping each American smoker from lighting up just one cigarette each day, the annual consequences are devastating: Cigarette consumption would drop by more than 18 billion units. Personal spending for cigarettes would decline by more than half a billion dollars.

  • 01/01/05 Philip Morris Around the Globe PM, Dec 17, 1986
      Written by Philip Morris' Andrew Whist, (who, incidentally, according to telephone records, maintains contact with Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson . . ) this document reads like a brag sheet:
        The government in Hong Kong responded to Philip Morris pressure by narrowing the differential between duties on imported leaf and finished cigarettes...significantly benefiting Philip Morris... In South Australia, Philip Morris significantly watered down an anti-smoking tobacco products control bill... In Venezuela, we were successful in stopping a detrimental, self-regulating advertising code... Our work in Senegal resulted in a new advertising decree which reversed a total advertising ban.
      This report reveals the sheer scope of global activity by Philip Morris (PM), but perhaps more importantly it also reveals the powerless state of governments before this corporate behemoth, as PM goes about restructuring countries' tax systems, repealing laws it doesn't like and blocking legislation pushed by citizenry. We can only ask ourselves how much progress would have been made around the world in reducing the spread of tobacco-related disease had Philip Morris put humanity above its own profits, and refrained from pouring so much of its resources into stopping, delaying and watering down health measures in every corner of the globe.

  • 01/01/04 RJR's Project YAX: Well-being in a Cigarette RJR, 1983
      This R.J. Reynolds document shows the psychological scrutiny that tobacco marketing departments give the psychological needs of young adults . . .
        A brand that stands for serenity via tranquil/majestic settings will be perceived by younger adult smokers as contributing to their sense of well-being....A brand that stands for the joy, closeness, and sense of belonging of male/female relationships via intimate and/or romantic situations will be perceived by younger adult smokers as contributing to their sense of well-being....A brand that stands for the openness and sense of belonging of friendships via close, interpersonal situations will be perceived by younger adult smokers as contributing to their sense of well-being...A brand that stands for financial security via achievable wealth-oriented imagery will be perceived by younger adults as contributing to their sense of well-being...
      So we see that RJR strove to encourage young adults to derive a sense of well-being, joy, closeness and serenity...from cigarettes -- a product which would ultimately addict and kill them.

  • 01/01/03 Tommy Thompson & Philip Morris PM, Sep 28, 1993
      The incoming president of the United States, George W. Bush, has nominated Wisconsin governor Tommy Thompson to head the federal Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), the agency which oversees many governmental health agencies that are responsible for tobacco control activities. Governor Tommy Thompson has close ties to thePhilip Morris Tobacco Company (PM). So close, in fact, that PM has actually been directly involved in raising funds for Mr. Thompson, as reflected in the following passage from a 1994 internal Philip Morris strategy document:
        In 1993, raised money for: . . Governor Tommy Thompson of WI
      The document also identifies that detriment to PM profits is the major justification for PM's continuing to fight measures to restrict public smoking,
        Smoking restrictions have been estimated this year alone to have decreased PM profits by $40 million...
      Furthermore, a quote shows us that PM curries favor with legislators by targeting its corporate grants to areas of "special interest to key elected officials." It also shows us how PMopportunistically creates public relations value for itself from natural disasters by ceremoniously presenting state governors with checks for disaster relief:
        Expand involvement of Corporate in making grants to public policy organizations and continue identifying grants that are special interest to key elected officials. Also take advantage of Disaster Relief Budget to involve governors in check presentations.
      A separate item (a letter) shows that Governor Thompson attended a PM Board of Directors dinner in 1992, and while there assured PM CEO (Michael Miles) that he would have direct access to the Governor for "items of mutual interest"

  • 00/12/30 Obituary Cig Ad Placement a Bad Idea
      Giant cigarette manufacturers who insist on running newspaper ads to promote deadly products have to be extra picky about where ads get placed. It's a real bummer, for example, if your ads get placed next to the obituaries in the newspaper, as happened here to Philip Morris (ironically, over and over).
        We have numerous complaints regarding Marlboro insertions that ran in your newspapers. The following details those problems:
        Paper Date Brand Problems
        Harrisonburg New-Record, VA 10/16/84 Marlboro Lights Ad ran opposite obituaries
        San Angelo Standard, TX 10/23/84 Marlboro Red Ad ran opposite obituaries
        Norwich Sun NY 10/23/84 Marlboro Red Ad ran opposite obituaries
        Stuttgart Daily Leader, AK 10/30/84 Marlboro Lights Ad ran backed by anti-smoking editorial...
        Athens Daily Post, TN 10/23/84 Marlboro Red Ad backed by American Cancer Society ad...

  • 00/12/28 Industry's "Youth Programs" Help Avoid Regulation TI?, Jun 10, 1985
      As we have already seen, the tobacco industry's "youth programs" help the industry deflect effective tobacco control legislation, regulation and increases in tobacco taxes. Such "kids don't smoke" programs also give the industry an aura of "self-regulation" which helps curry favor with, and give political cover to legislators who serve and protect the industry from regulation. This document is essentially the transcript of a talk given by a member of the Tobacco Institute. In the talk, he is bragging about how about how the Tobacco Institute's "Helping Youth Decide" was used to help the industry avoid just such regulation:
        Our representatives in New Hampshire and Maryland...used program to help head off sampling and transportation ad bans in those states respectively ... In Wisconsin, TI's Responsible Living Program was used a couple of weeks ago ... to avoid attachment of a sampling ban to a measure establishing an 18-year minimum cigarette sales age. In California ... In California, TI's Anne Browder testified, 'Helping Youth Decide' [helped] our people defeat half-cent cigarette tax increase earmarked for anti-smoking 'education' in the schools...

  • 00/12/26 Raising Taxes Promotes Quitting, Reduces Consumption PM, Jan 12, 1990
      According to Philip Morris' surveillance in California after the 1989 cigarette tax increase, raising cigarette taxes is an extremely effective way to reduce overall cigarette consumption and promote quitting. Here's what PM found:
        Effective January 1, 1989, the California cigarette tax rate was increased from 10 cents per pack to 35 cents...Relative to smokers in other states, Californians reduced their cigarette consumption [and] increased their quit rates... Californians smoked fewer cigarettes per day in 1988 than others in the rest of the country and even fewer in 1989 than 1988. The difference in their consumption rates between the years is almost three times as large as the difference for the rest of the sample...Californians also quit smoking more frequently than those in the rest of the country.
      So, both pro-smoking and anti-smoking forces agree that raising taxes on cigarettes is a highly effective way to promote public health--and it produces revenue for the government (or for more anti-smoking programs) to boot. This data should go a long ways towards encouraging more states to raise cigarette taxes.

  • 00/12/25 Spinning the Info on Secondhand Smoke PM, May 26, 1987
      By the 1980s, there was no longer any serious scientific doubt that exposure to secondhand smoke was detrimental to human beings. . . PM's "strictly confidential" words, previously unseen by the public, provide a stark outline of the company's frightening underlying global agenda against public health. . .
        End Goals:
      • Resist smoking restrictions
      • Restore smoker confidence
      • Prerequisites:
      • Reverse scientific and popular opinion
      • Restore social acceptability of smoking
      • Preserve product liability defences.
      Part of PM's routine strategy to fool the public about the dangers of secondhand smoke was to create its own independent "third party" allies who would act as "independent experts," and "spin" the issue its way in public testimony and the media. PM's intent to deceive the public is clearly revealed in this document, which says (of ACVA Atlantic, PM's "third party ventilation expert"):
        ACVA must be perceived to be at arm's length from the industry, including media briefings. Its role at most should seem as yet another third party expert amongst others.
      PM has never come clean about techniques like this that they have used to fool the public, nor have they publicly apologized for the damage they have done to public health by using such deceit. And yet in innumerable television and magazine ads today PM is casting itself as a socially responsible company. It was recently suggested that if PM truly wanted to be a socially responsible company, their ads would show PM employees hauling free oxygen concentrators, portable oxygen tanks, free nasal cannulas and tracheostomy supplies to the millions of sickened and homebound victims of their products.

  • 00/12/24 Tobacco Industry says Bans are Most Effective TI
      According to the Tobacco Institute itself, by far the most effective means of reducing cigarette consumption is to enact public and workplace smoking restrictions. In addition, the industry reports that in the absence of its own invasive social and cultural interference, overwhelming popular support exists for smoking restrictions in both eating and workplaces. . .
        Our 1984 Roper survey found increasing support for separate sections for smokers in public places, especially in eating and work places. A decade ago, about half the public favored separate smoking and nonsmoking sections in restaurants. Today, 90 percent do.
      Furthermore, the industry describes with hard numbers the extreme effectiveness of workplace smoking bans, saying that even the mildest smoking restrictions have a profound effect on the country's overall cigarette consumption rate:
        Those who say they work under restrictions smoked about one-and-one-quarter fewer cigarettes each day than those who don't. That may sound light but remember we're talking about light restrictions, too. Those 220 people in our survey who work under smoking restrictions represent some 15 million Americans. That one-and-one-quarter per day cigarette reduction then, means nearly 7 billion fewer cigarettes smoked each year because of workplace smoking restrictions... That's 350 million packs of cigarettes. At a dollar a pack, even the lightest of workplace smoking restrictions is costing this industry 233 million dollars a year in revenue.
      Thus there should no longer be disagreement in any sector about which measures are most effective in decreasing tobacco consumption across the board: public and workplace smoking bans.

  • 00/12/13 Philip Morris: Discreetly Threatening, and Worse PM, Feb, 1992
      This document summarizes the goals and activities of Philip Morris' European Science and Technology Unit in 1992.
        Demonstrate to lawmakers that, under the changed economic climate, the pursuit of outdated socioeconomic policies could easily become politically suicidal...Discreetly assist Third World countries in denouncing WHO's misleading anti-tobacco campaigns and in demanding discontinuation of these campaigns, in view of the potential damage they may otherwise cause to Third World economies and welfare.
      And even as recently as 1992, Philip Morris is shown here as bucking the common knowledge that tobacco use is bad for you, saying that one of their goals was to:
        Remove the 'moral' base of anti-tobacco legislative efforts by exposing the fallacious nature of most anti-tobacco allegations.
      For any who may be left who believe Philip Morris' current, far-reaching platitudes that "we've changed," the following passages reveals with crystal clarity the real reason WHY Philip Morris is trying so desperately to appear socially conscious: to taint juries who may serve in future trials against them:
        The Creation and Cultivation of Goodwill for Philip Morris - (This is not a "motherhood" objective). Goodwill is essential for succeeding in crucial situations, such as litigations (need for friendly witnesses and a good image of the Company), submissions to legislators (development of mutual trust with the bosses and sympathy of the staff), public debate (again trust and mutual respect). . .
        The creation of IAI, an independent international association on indoor air quality was discreetly solicited by S&T and put into effect by key ARIA members (ARIA is an association of our consultants. The name stands for Associates for Research on Indoor Air).

  • 00/12/11 Beneficial Additives: Medicating the Masses? PM, Mar 19, 1981
      In this Philip Morris document, Beneficial Additive Cigarette, scientists glibly and easily kick around the idea of medicating the general public for dental caries, reducing anxiety, cold symptoms, improving moods, etc. through cigarettes. Their frequent references to how careful they must be not to trigger FDA regulation makes one realize how important the FDA's "interference" is in protecting people from physical and chemical tinkering at the hands of the tobacco industry's "shade-tree pharmacists." . .
        Cigarettes delivering therapeutic agents, physiological effects, mood changes, or reducing dental caries, anxiety, colds, etc. received much discussion. Although cigarette filler is a relatively poor delivery device, tipping paper can be coated and the agents may be delivered orally. The questions of potential FDA jurisdiction and PM's inability to advertise these benefits was raised.
      Notice how ideas like introducing compounds into cigarettes that reduce oral plaque, freshen breath and reduce odors are considered good, while Idea #20, brushes off the obvious:
        Additives to reduce biological acitvity are not considered worth pursing at this time....The idea might be worth pursuing when we have identified specific compounds responsible for activity.

  • 00/12/07 Menthol and Nicotine 'Impact' PM, Mar 29, 1995
      A number of documents (including this one, which relates results of a study done at Philip Morris' overseas lab for biological studies, INBIFO ) reveal that menthol enhances the sensory, or drug effect, of nicotine.
        It was found that menthol increased 'impact' for the low nicotine delivery cigarette...as a function of the menthol content. . . It was concluded that menthol has a pronounced effect on nicotine-derived 'impact.'
      The term "impact" when used in industry documents is frequently offset in quotes. In position papers, Philip Morris' official definition of the term "impact" is a "feeling sensation rather than odor or taste." They further compare it to the carbonation in soda pop or the spicy heat in chili peppers. People who have worked inside the industry, though, tell us that "impact" refers to the drug effect of a substance, particularly nicotine. In reading large numbers of documents, it is interesting to see that Philip Morris performed many (and what appears to be the majority) of its human biological studies internally on their own R&D (Research and Development Department) employees. What could have been the reason that PM avoided using outside subjects? What could have been the effect on the employees?

  • 00/12/05 Control of 'Grasstops' Government PM, Mar 30, 1993
      This 1993 document, Grasstops Government Relations, is a basic but very thorough description of the strategies Philip Morris (PM) uses to achieve such powerful influence over legislation in the U.S. PM has analyzed virtually every part of a legislator's world, and misses no opportunity to exert influence, even to the point of currying favor with a legislators' spouses:
        We also make sure that we know the legislator's -- and his or her spouses -- favorite philanthropies and try to support them. . . We make sure legislators are aware of, and invited to, promotional and cultural events funded by Philip Morris. . . [W]e try to keep Philip Morris out of the media on issues like taxation, smoking bans and marketing restrictions. Instead, we try to provide the media with statements in support of our positions from third party sources, which carry more credibility than our company and have no apparent vested interest...we create coalitions of third party sources to help carry our baggage on issues. For example, on excise taxes, we work with state and local CARTS, the acronym for Committee Against Regressive Taxation...restaurant owners on smoking bans...retailers on the minimum age issue...and influential groups like the Association of National Advertisers on marketing restrictions. ..Finally, we try to change the focus on the issues. Cigarette tax become[s] an issue of fairness and effective tax policy. Cigarette marketing is an issue of freedom of commercial speech. Environmental tobacco smoke becomes an issue of accommodation. Cigarette-related fires become an issue of prudent fire safety programs. And so on.
      [T]he long-term failure of American legislatures to enact meaningful tobacco control in the face of recognition of the current epidemic of tobacco-induced disease is testimony to the astonishing effectiveness of this one company in controlling the machinations of governments.

  • 00/12/01 Total Ban on Advertising? No Big Deal PM, Apr, 1986
      As this document demonstrates, whatever laws they may choose to enact, governments are powerless to reign in the disease-spreading activities of Philip Morris, which laughs at advertising bans, viewing them as opportunities that lead them to new and more pervasive marketing ideas, like creating Marlboro fashion wear and Marlboro travel vacations (which of course constitute not cigarette ads, but clothing and travel ads, respectively). . . Note how Philip Morris violates not only the spirit of the law, but when it deems that the risk of being caught is sufficiently low, also the letter of the law:
        Finally, we even advertised in some periods when the risk of being fined was perceived to be lower.
      Note the use of terms in this document like "para-advertising," "diversification" and "co-advertising" that denote ways they get around the Italian ad ban. . . Also, note the introduction of promotional techniques that are particularly damaging, like Philip Morris' new "World Tennis Championship of Doctors" featuring tennis-playing professors. . . This document is a primer on how cigarette corporations get around government regulations and in the doing, work their way even deeper into the cultures of different countries.

  • 00/11/28 The PR War & Discontent with the Industry PM? 1990
      It isn't often you get to read something that shows that fear inside the tobacco industry, but here is one such document. Ten years ago the industry noted that a former staunch ally, the Economist magazine, did a 180-degree turn, printing an article that stated that tobacco "...kills about 3M people a year around the world, and the number is rising fast" The article went on to cite the "...obvious self-interest and fraudulent arguments of the tobacco and alcohol lobbies..."and actually called these entities "lying killers." . . The paper explores the reasons for the public's "discontent" with the tobacco industry.
        The pressure against us is growing at a frightening speed...Defeat, like fear, is contagious. Once people sense surrender is in the air, the collapse of the whole operation can come with enormous rapidity....The collapse of South Vietnam is a graphic case in point.
      The writer then lays out a strategic plan of action to deal with the dire situation. Once again however, opposite to the industry's 1954 pledge in the "Frank Statement" that it intended to work with public health entities, their strategy consists of fanning the flames of doubt about its products, utilizing third parties to do the industry's bidding, and carrying on "offensive" media campaigns. But perhaps the most important strategic point made by this paper, is the reason why preserving advertising and sponsorship is so important to this industry. These activities buy them a host of extremely powerful supporters. Losing these supporters would devastate the industry's power base because it would drastically cut the industry's political and media clout.
        If one takes the pessimistic view of present trends, the tobacco industry could lose almost all its political clout within two years. Overstated? Not really. If you take away advertising and sponsorship, you lost most, if not all, of your media and political allies.

  • 00/11/27 Application of Pesticides in Turkey PM, Dec 4, 1989
      This document gives us an idea of the laxity of procedures in application of pesticides to tobacco in developing countries. This (Philip Morris) document reveals that not only was very little if any attention paid to the safety of the workers applying the chemicals, but also little if any monitoring of the application of the pesticides to the tobacco itself. With an unregulated, monitored and uninspired product that people regularly take into their bodies, a situation such as this could be a problem.
        Treatments are conducted under tarpaulin (tent) of selected tobacco stacks within dealer storage areas...No monitoring is PH5 gas concentrations during application, gassing, or degassing periods are performed...Neither monitoring pumps or gas concentration tubes were available for use by State license fumigators. . . Two phosphine accidents occurred in 1988 from lack of pesticide safety knowledge: (1) at one location four employees were informed they could enter a phosphine tarpaulin treatment area because an expert assured them "there was no problem, the gas will not hurt you." All four had to be taken to a local hospital for phosphine gas exposure.

  • 00/11/21 Smoking and Attention Deficit Disorder PM, Jun 13, 1977
      Philip Morris scientists hypothesize that adult smokers are hykerkinetic children who have grown up, and who are now self-medicating with cigarettes. The writer draws a parallel between Ritalin and nicotine, saying,
        ...the stimulant characteristics of nicotine enabled [smokers] to control some of their behavior problems just as Ritalin does for today's children.
      It is also interesting that the report says that smokers are more impulsive and have more accidents than nonsmokers. To test the hypothesis about whether adult smokers are hyperactives who are self-medicating with nicotine, the PM scientists sought ways to monitor children for a number of years to see if there was a preponderance of smokers among adults who, as children, were diagnosed as being hyperactive. It appears that having to gain parental consent for such a study might have been a roadblock...
        Although school system records would seem best suited for such research...restrictions on access to records,...[and] on the use of children in research without the informed consent of their parents will keep us out of the school systems until the rules are rewritten...

  • 00/11/20 PM: Create a Public Backlash, Motivate People to Fight Gov't PM, Dec, 1990
      This is an outline of the Philip Morris Tobacco Company's (PM) strategic plans to fight workplace smoking bans in Europe. . . It is interesting that the very governments that permit this company to operate within their borders are unaware of this company's workings to incite the people against the government. . . Also, note PM's intent to concoct surveys which reflect its own ideas, and to hide behind "respected polling firms": . . Also,notice how vastly expensive and grandiose plans roll so easily off PM's planning docket--strategies that public health entities could never afford to employ, like publishing books, commissioning videos and training and touring around speakers to speak on their behalf:
        --Identify speakers such as sociologists, psychologists, freedom advocates, etc. and place them in appropriate speaking forums....
        -- Publish a book or series of articles on past and present paradoxes of free and democratic societies.
        --Commission a video of the future when drinking milk is only by prescription.
        --Mail articles and books to liberal journalists and freedom issues likely to generate support on the principles involved.<
        /ul>

    • 00/11/14 The Marboro Man Eats Veggie Fajitas PM, Jul 15, 1992
        In the early 1990's, . . Philip Morris sought to re-make the image of the Marlboro Man into a new-age, sensitive pop icon that would appeal to these new-age sensitive guys of the 90's. They sought to alter the cowboy-icon's image from "Cowboys are outlaws. Cowboys are brutal. Cowboys eat pork and beans. to "Cowboys are kind. Cowboys eat grilled vegetable fajitas...Cowboys dance with wolves." . .

          New Myth:

          Cowboys are sensitive.
          Cowboys are advocates of the land.
          Cowboys are Indians.
          Women are cowboys.
          Cowboys ride the range with their wives.
          Cowboys have principles.
          Cowboys are kind.
          Cowboys eat grilled vegetable fajitas.

        In short, they sought to change the cowboy from a "John Wayne" image to a kinder-gentler "Kevin Costner" image. Of course, the marketing and promotional potential of this re-make was unlimited: promotional tie-ins could include piggybacking on the causes of land preservation and the environment, adding expensive silver and turquoise Indian jewelry to the Marlboro Gear catalog, offering "soft adventure" vacations where smokers could go rafting and hiking at the Marlboro Ranch... And oh, the appeal to women!

    • 00/11/13 PM, May 27, 1987: The Industry on Taxes, Liability, ETS and More
        This document, "Social-Political Context of Cigarette Sales and Use in the U.S. - 1987", is full of revelations. It analyzes the myriad problems facing the tobacco industry, including the decrease in the social acceptability of smoking, the proliferation of attempts to enact local public-smoking restrictions, product liability suits, the possibility of advertising restrictions, federal excise taxes, and legislation to require that cigarettes be fire-safe. The document is extraordinarily prescient, and shows us the industry is able to predict the future with great accuracy. It also tells us what it fears most andwhat really works to decrease smoking rates. . .
        • It is apparent that the effects of ETS on others is now the most powerful anti-smoking weapon being employed against the industry . . .
        • The problem with tax increases is that it does decrease consumption, just as desired by the social engineers posing these increases want to see. . .
        • If legislation is passed [mandating fire-safe cigarettes] it would probably be necessary to modify several aspects of current cigarette construction. This could have a negative impact on per unit costs. . .
        • This gloomy picture of 1987 and beyond must be interpreted in terms of opportunity as well as challenge....A threat to the industry can be an opportunity for the company which can find consumer acceptable answers to the types of challenges discussed in this memo. . .
        Let us also not forget that one of the keys to this industry's miraculous survival has been its tendency to view threats as opportunities (one example is the introduction of filter cigarettes in response to the "health scares" of the 1950's and 60's--a move which made the industry more profitable than ever)

    • 00/11/11 PM: Cigarettes Saved the Earth! PM, Apr 17, 1975
        My instinctive reaction to the movie of the cat whose appetite for mice is blocked by nicotine is that we should arrange as promptly as possible a showing on national television.... .The film could be tested "as is" and also with an accompanying narrative which spells out its implications for the world of people. There might be several versions of such an accompanying script. Perhaps the most hard-hitting claim would be to come right out and say that the Indians kew what they were talking about when they spoke of the "peace pipe" and that we believed Leonid Brezhnev, cigarette smoker, was somewhat less likely to push his side's atomic war button than a Leonid Breshnev whose cigarettes had been taken away from him.

    • 00/11/9 Creating the Appearance of Controversy B&W? Sep, 1979
        By the mid-1970s, public health agencies had done a good job of getting word out to the public that tobacco caused deadly diseases. Science had proven the case and all that remained to be done was to keep spreading the word to the public. But rather than cooperating with public health agencies, as the industry promised in its widely-published "Frank Statement" of 1954, ("We always have and always will cooperate with those whose task it is to safeguard the public health.") the tobacco industry took it upon itself to whip up the appearance of a "controversy" about smoking and health where there really was none at all. The goal was stated succinctly by William Kloepfer, public relations manager of the Tobacco Institute, in this 1979 internal document:
          Our objective is to bring a seemingly closed subject back to the level of controversy in the public's mind.
        How how many people might never have started smoking, and how many lives would have been saved worldwide had the tobacco industry not worked so hard, and invested so much money and years of effort, into the fight against public health?

    • 00/11/8 The Odor Of Free Nicotine 'Will Almost Bowl One Over' B&W? 1971
        "Project Mad Hatter" was designed to
          maximize the desirable constituents of smoke and minimize the undesirable ones. . . we are in a nicotine rather than a tobacco industry . . . Another easy test of free nicotine odor and irritation involves smelling some as it is eluted from a gas chromatograph. -- a small amount will almost knock one over and the aroma is apparent.
        If the aroma and irritation from a small amount of free nicotine is so powerful that it can "almost knock one over," and since the industry has greatly increased the amount of free nicotine in cigarettes since the 1960's, how can this industry justify opposing laws banning indoor smoking? This is an admission that this substance is physically irritating. (Unless, of course, they hide such internal insights about free nicotine from the public, legislators and boards of health.)

    • 00/11/3 SAWP's "Countermeasures" against Health RJR, May 20, 1979
        In the late 1970's eleven major tobacco companies around the world joined together to form the International Committee on Smoking Issues, or ICOSI. The purpose of ICOSI was to determine how the companies would deal with the global proliferation of smoking restrictions and the unilateral decline in social acceptability of smoking around the world. A subcommittee of ICOSI was formed called the Social Acceptability Working Party or SAWP. This document is an update on SAWP's progress in coming up with a plan to reverse the decline in the social acceptability of smoking. We can see clearly from this document that the anti-tobacco arguments that were most most damaging to the industry and most effective at reducing the worldwide smoking rate and were 1) secondhand smoke and passive smoking, 2) the social costs of smoking on society and 3) the discourtesy of smoking in front of others. SAWP concluded that the negative attitudes about smoking, if left unchecked
          ... will eventually solidify into strong beliefs -- creating even further pressures for the suppression or banning of smoking in public places.
        The conclusion of the working party is expressed boldly, in caps, and underlined:
          WE MUST START TRYING TO MOLD PUBLIC OPINION FAVORABLY ON THE SOCIAL ACCEPTABILITY OF SMOKING.
        If it were not for the tobacco industry's actions, the global smoking rate would have continued to decline, and the death rate from tobacco use would have declined along with it. The tobacco industry's actions set world health back many decades. For this they offer no apology and no acknowledgement, but instead are asking us to simply forget their actions.

    • 00/11/1 Hill and Knowlton: an Expose PM, 1992
        This document, Health and Morality -- Tobacco's Counter Campaign, should be mandatory reading. It is a historical account describing the key part that the public relations firm of Hill and Knowlton played on behalf of the tobacco industry in obfuscating the link between tobacco use and disease. . . The document is authored by John W. Hill II, and was sent to Murray Bring . . .
          The stakes in this ongoing public relations battle are enormous. On one side of the ledger is the health of more than 200 million teen-agers and adults. One (sic) the other side are [the] profits, even survival, of the tobacco industry in dependence on the 55.8 million addicted smokers as of 1988.
        Furthermore, to his credit, Hill later broke completely with the industry's tactic of forming front groups to protect profits:
          Over time John Hill had stoutly asserted that paper groups established by a client to promote a cause under the guise of being independent should be eliminated from the public relations profession. 'The right of free speech also carries the obligation that the source of it will be open for all to see,' he wrote. 'It is not the work of public relations--let it always be emphasized--to outsmart the American public by helping management build profits.' But in fact the TIRC was essentially a front for the public relations work of the industry, created to blunt the growing threat to the cigarette makers' enormous profits.

    • 00/10/29 TI: Bad Kid Ads Show Smoking As Unhealthy, Repugnant TI, May, 1982
        Tobacco industry-created "kids-shouldn't smoke" programs are designed to assure children in a subtle way that smoking is a really positive choice that one can look forward to making in the future. This industry puts forth its own "youth programs" because campaigns designed by anti-smoking groups "present[ed] smoking as repugnant and unhealthy." According to this Tobacco Institute document, the goals for the tobacco industry's "kids don't smoke" campaigns include
          offset further erosion of the industry's image in this area, reverse political trends and gain recognition of our efforts from public service organizations and public officials.
        But the goal of reducing or eliminating the problem of nicotine addiction among youth remains conspicuously absent. . .
          Federal and local legislation has been proposed to deal with the [youth smoking] issue. And, naturally, anti-smoking groups have spent a good deal of time and money discouraging youngsters from smoking. Unlike our proposed project, they present smoking as repugnant and unhealthy.

    • 00/10/23 CTR & "Public Relations" Pseudo-science PM, Jun 24, 1974
        This confidential Lorillard memorandum was faxed to Philip Morris by the law firm Shook, Hardy and Bacon. It was found in a file called "Cipollone Problem Documents," referring to an early liability lawsuit against the industry. It reveals that the "smoking and health research" programs that were carried on for so many years by the tobacco industry's jointly-funded Council on Tobacco Research (CTR)
          have not been selected against specific scientific goals, but rather for various purposes such as public relations, political relations, position for litigation, etc.
        Carrying on "smoking and health" research projects that secretly were designed to benefit the industry's public and political relations gave the industry cover to claim to the unwitting public for many years that they were spending millions on research into smoking and health and "haven't discovered anything conclusive." It gave the appearnce that they were "doing something" about the smoking and health problem, and had the added bonus of creating "studies" that benefited political perceptions of their product.

    • 00/10/22 Philip Morris Battles Health Efforts In Asia PM, Jun 15, 1989
        PM feared a ramping up of health efforts in Asia, and also feared the efforts of American health groups to draw world attention to the cigarette industry's Asian export practices. There was (and probably still is) very good reason for this: Asian cigarette exports account for a huge portion of the tobacco industry's profits. Note the astounding statistic that PM itself reveals on the vast importance of Asian cigarette exports to their bottom line:
          We should remember that U.S. cigarette exports to Asia account for close to 70% of our volume and 97% of our profits
        PM further responded to increased tobacco control efforts in Asia by expanding their "Whitecoat Project" into Asia. They successfully pulled in additional funding from the R.J. Reynolds and Brown and Williamson tobacco companies to help expand the project into Asia:
          PM, RJR and B&W agreed to fund a network of ETS scientists in Asia. Candidates have been identified in Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Philippines and Thailand.... At the end of a training session in late June we will have a core of 10 scientists who are fully trained on the issues, ready and prepared to make a contribution by way of writing articles, briefing government officials and so forth
        This document reveals the deep, pervasive, damaging (and very effective) interference that these powerful American tobacco companies exert on the government, culture and health affairs of foreign countries in which they are permitted to do business.

    • 00/10/20 The Marboro Man is Gay PM, Feb, 1994
        This document is the result of a a focus group session done by a market research company to try and find out which types of imagery (in this case, which poses of the Marlboro Man) would sell cigarettes to gay men.
          Maintaining the highest share of the gay market, Marlboro imagery is fairly instant and clearly dominated by the Marlboro Man. Among gay consumers, this image has particular importance as an overt cue to masculinity/sexuality. Marlboro's success in this context depends wholly on the relevance of this cowboy image to the world (fantasy and real) of these gay consumers. . . NEGATIVES: . . Common . . . Has a regular job; nothing out of the ordinary. Drives something American, a few years old. Blends in with the world. . . He could be a good friend but probably not much past that. Maybe a great one-nighter, but no one you'd want to spend everyday with. What would you talk about? Drag racing? False masculinity... Tries real hard to let you know how butch he is. No real confidence. Macho. / Only dances if he's drunk. Redneck.. Likes to square dance . . . All the worst qualities of straight men rolled into an attractive gay man.

    • 00/10/17 Countermeasures Development Program PM, May 20, 1979
        This is a speech made in confidence by a Philip Morris representative to the members of the global tobacco industry at a meeting of the International Committee on Smoking Issues (ICOSI). . . Note the warlike tone . . .
          We must also have countermeasures going directly to the antis. We can no longer ignore them....Between government and the antis, there is now mutual support. In many countries, it is hard to tell the antis from certain branches of government. That's the reason why the industry has to start attacking the antis directly with countermeasures. . . But in developing countermeasures, I believe we mustn't forget that a state of war does exist... Countermeasures are weapons, or combinations of weapons....We must produce a continual supply of the AMMUNITION.
        This clandestine speech before members of the global tobacco industry is in stark contrast to the public rhetoric the industry published in the "Frank Statement" of 1954, wherein they said:
          We accept an interest in people's health as a basic responsibility, paramount to every other consideration in our business. . . We always have and always will cooperate with those whose task it is to safeguard the public health.
        Should an industry that publicly promises to protect public health while secretly declaring war on public health be trusted? How about five years later? Ten, or twenty years later?

    • 00/10/16 TI Issue Strategy: Deflect, Redefine, Broaden TI, Apr 10, 1985
        This is a confidential speech . . . about the the difficulties the industry faces from the environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) issue. . . it says clearly that the most effective way to reduce smoking overall is to enact smoking bans:
          The logical appeal of smoke-free air is irresistible to politicians, commentators, even some smokers. It is the most effective way to reduce smoking.
        If WE say smoke-free laws are effective at reducing the overall smoking rate, and the INDUSTRY confirms this same thing (as the Tobacco Institute does in this document) then there is no longer any disagreement that smoke-free laws are entirely beneficial to public health. Legislators should take note that both anti-tobacco advocates and the industry are in complete agreement on this point. . . Also, in this document the president of the Tobacco Institute admits that few people (or entities) other than the tobacco industry itself are motivated to oppose smoking restrictions:
          We seem to be trying to protect a population without a popular will to join the resistance.
        Thirdly, the document reveals the industry's acknowledgment that secondhand smoke exposure will never be proven safe:
          We need to be candid with ourselves in recognizing that it will never be established that there are no effects [from ETS exposure].
        And lastly, Mr. Kloepfer's speech lays out the tobacco industry's game-plan for dealing not only with the ETS issue, but with most of the other damaging issues they have faced:
          To summarize, the direction we are headed will be to deflect this [ETS] issue, to redefine it, to broaden it, to demonstrate as we have in the case of accidental fires and youth behavior that we are contributing to the solution rather than to the problem.
        The triple-strategy of 1) deflecting the issue, 2) broadening the issue and 3) appearing to contribute to a solution is seen repeatedly in the documents and it is how the tobacco industry deals with issues that are damaging. This document will definitely be important to quote from at public hearings for smoke-free laws.

    • 00/10/15 Marketing Strategies For Camel RJR, Mar 10, 1988
        This marketing proposal for RJR's "Camel" brand reveals the goals of cigarette marketing: to appeal to basic human needs and emotions. I was particularly struck by the controlling language used in this piece, e.g., "Force a one-on-one relationship between the brand and the smoker," and "Forces the smoker to study the pack...". I was also unsettled by the exploitation of basic human emotions, particularly those of younger people, as marketing tools: greed, avarice, mating rituals, humor, the need to be admired, vanity, etc. This piece may be helpful for media literacy instruction, as it reveals that the "science" of advertising can be quite offensive to us "targets."
          Purpose: Create a 1989 theme or "big idea" for Camel that accommodates the following... 1) Merges the brand's 75-years of authenticity...and masculine independence into the mind-set of an 18-24 year old target smoker. 2) Uses the Camel brand as a psychological bridge between the target and their fantasies. 3) Integrates as many of the target's basic emotional drives as possible....Force a one-on-one relationship between the Brand and the smoker...Welcome the target smoker into the concept and allow he/she to personalize it to their own interpretation and fantasies.... Concept: Focus attention on Pack history, authenticity and intrigue... Execution: Use a series of mysteries, missing items, changed visuals and folklore, with direct incentives for "studying" the Pack. Forces the target smoker to physically pick up the pack, scrutinize it and show it to his/her friends.

    • 00/10/13 History Of Tobacco Industry Advertising PM, Aug, 1987
        This document, while marked "confidential," was produced outside the industry. It is a fascinating chronology of the history of cigarette advertising by Dr. Richard Pollay, a professor of marketing. It gives an insight into the industry's invasive advertising tactics that can only be had by taking a historical look at the industry's advertising behavior.
          1917 -- Rivalry between CAMELS and LUCKY STRIKE involves scandalous rumors. American Tobacco suspected by R.J. Reynolds of disseminating rumors of salt petre in tobacco, and factor workers with leprosy and syphilis. Claims that agents would enter streetcars, one from the front and one from the rear, and hold a loud conversation about these...and then exit to repeat again and again. R.J. Reynolds posts $500 reward notices. . . 1925 -- Women consuming 5% of total cigarettes... 1935 -- 20% adult women smoking.

    • 00/10/12 TI 'Fire Safety Program' And Increased Fire Deaths TI, Sep 18, 1986
        Four years after the Tobacco Institute started its "Fire Safety Program," the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) reported that the rate of fire deaths in the United States had jumped by an astounding 20% in residences and 18% overall ("the largest one-year jump in decades") showing that the Institute's vastly expensive "Fire Safety program" had been a dismal failure at reducing fires. . . Today's document is a letter from the president of Tri Data Corp. to the Tobacco Institue and Covington and Burling that reflects the Institute's primary area of concern about these statistics. Note that concern was not the increase in
          NFPA has just released the latest (1985) fire statistics. The news is very bad. Fire deaths jumped up in 1985, by 20% in residences and 18% overall. This is the largest one-year jump in decades... We can assume...that deaths from careless smoking will be sharply higher, too. Since smoke detectors are perceived by the fire service as close to saturating the market, there may well be pressure to turn to new approaches -- like fire safe cigarettes.

    • 00/10/11 TI on Fire Service: 'Support for Hostiles = Innoculation' TI, May 9, 1989
        Todays document is a report on the Institute's activities dealing with the "Accidental Fire Issue." It contains some telling information and telltale handwritten notations by Martin J. Gleason of the Tobacco Institute. For example, the document mentions Andrew McGuire, who was the director of the nonprofit Burn Council, which was a counseling and education organization based at San Francisco General Hospital. Mcguire was an outspoken advocate of the need for a self-extinguishing cigarette. . . . McGuire's strong public health/consumer advocacy made him an enemy of the tobacco industry. Fittingly, Gleason's handwritten comment by McGuire's name says simply, "Discredit" -- underlined twice. . . But perhaps Gleason's most telling handwritten comment on this document about TI fire service programs says, "Cont[inue] support for hostiles -- innoculation" indicating that the tremendous financial support the tobacco industry gave to the the fire service carried with it the expectation that it would neutralize their opposition."

    • 00/10/03 Osdene (of PM): "I will act on them and destroy" PM, Undated
        Philip Morris conducted biological research on the health effects of tobacco and cigarettes at INBIFO, research that was performed offshore to keep the information it revealed out of PM's files in the U.S, since if it were in files in this country it would then be subject to discovery in a lawsuit. If these documents were subject to discovery, then people could find out what the company knew, when they knew it, and what they were doing in Cologne, Germany. . .
          OK to phone and telex (these will be destroyed).... ... If important letters or documents have to be sent please send to home -- I will act on them and destroy.

    • 00/10/01 Fighting Free Choice: Battling Voluntary Restrictions TI, Undated
        In complete contrast to its public statements about freedom of choice, the industry aggressively opposes people's free choice to enact smoking restrictions. Today's document is a speech by Peter Sparber of the Tobacco Institute. Sparber, speaking to the executive board of the Institute, reveals the industry's aggressive plans to beat back a flood of voluntary actions on the part of business owners to make their workplaces smoke-free.
          The voluntary restriction of smoking by businesses, associations, public agencies and even labor unions is one of the most damaging and most insidious challenges we face.... We have opposed public smoking laws by arguing that such matters should be voluntary. Now that they are increasingly voluntary, what do we think? ..This morning we are prepared to outline a program to deal aggressively and efficiently with the voluntary restriction of smoking by businesses, labor unions, public agencies and other private organizations.
        The speech also reveals the industry's intent to gain support of labor unions through a system of grants and legislative favors. . .
          Overall we will create the sense that organized labor will not tolerate smoking restrictions ..We also propose a financial relationship with organized labor.
        But the real reason the industry wanted the support of labor unions . . . was to influence the smoking policies being made by corporations and agencies:
          Organized labor is of vital importance, but ultimately, it is not labor that we want to influence. Corporations and public agencies are our first targets.

    • 00/09/30 The 'Frank Statement' of 1954 TI, Jan 4, 1954
        The publication of the Frank Statement marked the beginning of the industry's long-term plan to disseminate misinformation about the health effects of tobacco to the American public. . . Their statement contradicted what medical consensus had shown by that time, namely that tobacco use caused cancer and other respiratory diseases. Furthermore, the industry had not produced any evidence showing that their product was not injurious to health. Rather than cooperating as they promised with "those whose task it is to safeguard the public health," history reveals that the industry's actions instead have been 1) to criticize studies by independent scientists that reveal the hazards of their products, 2) generate a sense of controversy about the health effects of their products . . . 3) misrepresent the safety of its products by continuing to advertise their products as though they were safe . . . 4) marketing to children by using cartoon characters and exploiting the adolescent phenomenon of peer pressure, 6) chemically adjusting their products to enhance addiction . . . and mask the warning properties of smoke (adding "smootheners").
          We accept an interest in people's health as a basic responsibility, paramount to every other consideration in our business. We believe the products we make are not injurious to health . . . We always have and always will cooperate with those whose task it is to safeguard the public health.

    • 00/09/29 "The base of our business is the high school student" Lorillard, Aug 30, 1978
        This is the famous Lorillard memo which states flatly,
          "the base of our business is the high school student.
        It was written by a member of Lorillard's sales force refers to the "in status" of the Newport brand among young people. The recipient of the memo was Curtis Judge, the President of Lorillard. Despite this acknowledgment from his own field sales force that children formed the basis of their company's cigarette business, just a few months later, in May of 1979, Mr. Judge wrote a letter to Joseph Califano (Secretary of Health Education and Welfare) in response to accusations that the industry's advertising appealed to children. In the letter, Mr. Judge denies any attempts by his company to appeal to children. Judge said,
          For many years Lorillard has avoided directing the appeal of its advertising to young persons....Everyone, including Lorillard, agrees that children should not smoke...We neither direct the appeal of our advertising to children, nor do we encourage them to start to smoke. In sum, Mr. Secretary, we do not advertise to children and do not intent to do so in the future. [Letter from Curtis Judge to Joseph A. Califano Jr. 19790517]

    • 00/09/28 TI, 1981: The problem of fire-scarred victims
        The industry fought fire-safe cigarette proposals, stating that such changes would "unduly [affect] the nature of the product." They proposed instead that all furniture manufacturers make fire-resistant furniture. . .
          Neither industry response has been particularly effective in offsetting fire scarred victims interviewed by the news media and paraded before legislative committees.
        If the industry appeared to lack somewhat in empathy for the victims of cigarette fires, though, they nevertheless realized they had a formidable legislative problem on their hands . . . the tobacco industry embarked on a vast public relations campaign to create the appearance of concern about fire safety, particularly to legislators. The campaign propsed PR activities like putting out "fire safety calendar" in conjunction with local fire service agencies urging people, for example, to take care around their Christmas trees. Less known to the public, however, was that the campaign included giving extraordinary levels of financial support to firefighting agencies nationwide. The campaign was highly successful, ultimately buying the silence of the fire service industry on the subject of self-extinguishing cigarettes, and turning fire service agencies nationwide into allies for the tobacco industry when it came to heading off fire-safe cigarette legislation.

    • 00/09/22 Monumental industry addiction blooper PM, Dec 4, 1982
        In 1981 George Mackin, Director of Sales for Philip Morris, United Kingdom gave a presentation to the Retail Confectioners' and Tobacconists Association in Majorca. An article based on his speech was subesquently published in the trade journal Confectioners, Tobacconist Newsagent on December 4, 1981. In describing to retailers the value of selling cigarettes, George wrote:
          Cigarettes are not just habit forming -- the body builds up a requirement for them. Twenty million smokers cannot do without their weed. Take the example of a man going to work in the morning. It is pouring with rain. . . Would he stop for a newspaper? Would he get wet for a kit kat? . . The answer is probably No, but he would stop for his fags, because he is addicted to cigarettes. And while buying a pack he takes a morning paper and a Kit Kat. With 20 million regular smokers in this country, there is an enormous traffic opportunity built up exclusively on tobacco -- and a lot of it could come your way.
        Frank Colby, Associate Director of Scientific Issues in the Research Department at R.J. Reynolds (RJR) was NOT amused, and on January 26,1982, fired off a note to Samuel B Witt III, Esquire at RJR which he entitled
          With Friends Like This, We NEED Enemies

    • 00/09/21 Philip Morris' 'Merit Awards' program (death)PM, 1994
        This document is a promotional mailing from the Philip Morris tobacco company (PM) which contains coupons for discounts on Merit cigarettes. PM sent this particular mailing to a deceased customer, dead at age 51-- from smoking Merit cigarettes. The caregiver of the deceased's 94 year-old father returned the promotion to PM with the following note:
          Dear Ms. Suter, Mrs. Williams died 21 months ago from smoking your product. Do not send any more of your stuff to this address again. I am her father's (94 yrs) non-smoking caregiver. The 94 year old is a nonsmoker. Mrs. Williams was a beautiful 51 year old. I feel sorry for you people.

    • 00/09/18 TI removing the rights of Americans TI, Dec 10, 1992
        Andrew Tisch brags about the Tobacco Institute's pervasive interference in the democratic process:
          In state and local affairs, we have, with a few significant exceptions, enjoyed a remarkably successful 1992. Of more than 1,000 anti-tobacco pieces of legislation, regulation or voter initiatives, just 65 were approved....Smoking bans and restrictions were proposed in 32 states and passed in just 9....Bans on sampling and promotional distribution of tobacco products were proposed in 23 states and were defeated in 22. Retail or vending sales restrictions were proposed in 31 states and defeated in 26....Legislation mandating "fire-safe" cigarettes was introduced in five states and defeated in all....Campaigns were mounted to qualify...tax proposals for ballots in Colorado, Oregon, Nebraska and Arkansas. Thanks in large measure to Institute efforts, none made it.
        But obviously, the tobacco industry noted the relative success rate of tobacco control efforts at the local level, so their next step was to remove Americans' rights to pass local laws, as evidenced by this chilling passage:
          We know that the most effective way to address these local issues is to urge adoption of statewide laws that prohibit local action. To date, we have succeeded in doing just that in 8 states. We have targeted another 17 in 1993.

    • 00/09/17 PM: Dealing with employee demoralization at PM
        This document makes it clear that Philip Morris management realizes it isn't easy to be an employee of the world's biggest manufacturer of a deadly product. Here, they outline the need for a program that will "reassure and comfort" PM employees and help them deal with the demoralizing aspects of their employment. In this document, it becomes clear that PM is (or was) in complete denial about the devastating effects of their products. . . After reading this, one could easily believe that such "feel good" ad campaigns as PM is currently putting on (PM feeds the hungry, gives to domestic violence shelters, etc.) are as much for the benefit of their own employees as to try boost their public image. . .
          Public awareness of the health and social issues surrounding smoking is very high. This is mainly due to what they see and hear in the media. . . As a result of these popular beliefs, public tolerance of smoking and tobacco companies' commercial activities have declined to a point where both smokers and companies are in danger of becoming social pariahs. . . Instead of knowing nothing the reaction we should aim to engender in our employees may be something like this: "These are complex issues but since joining PM I've learnt that there is another side to the story." A full briefing on the social and health issues surrounding smoking would be beneficial for both the sales force confidence and for helping them to handle objections in a more professional, informed manner.

    • 00/09/16 TI: Smokers don't rebel TI
        The Tobacco Institute (TI) did its best to fight the initial airline smoking ban, saying it would cause a smoker rebellion and carrying on "non-public" actions like prompting tobacco company employees and employees to write letters to the Department of Transportation and Congress opposing the ban. This letter-writing network, which encompassed not only tobacco industry employees but employees of their subsidiaries, like Kraft and Nabisco, was often used by the Tobacco Institute to skew the appearance of public opinion to agencies and legislators on tobacco issues. The network was called the Tobacco Action Network, or TAN. The Tobacco Institute never denied that secondhand smoke exposure in aircraft cabins was dangerous. Rather, they deflected attention from the problem of ETS exposure by broadening the issue into one of overall air quality, taking the discussion into addressing problems on aircraft with "ozone, cosmic radiation, microbes, viruses." Perhaps of more interest, though, is the admission in this document that, much to the Institute's frustration, a rebellion by real smokers failed to materialize. Instead they noted that smokers went along with the ban easily, with no hint of "rebellion." This typical real-life reaction of smokers to smoking bans is completely counter to the industry's repeated predications (even now) that mayhem and economic devastation will occur from such bans.
          [B]y all accounts, implementation of the ban went very smoothly. This really isn't surprising...smokers are law-abiding and reasonable people. At same time, we were somewhat surprised that there weren't at least a few random incidents since there was little public discussion of the ban until the day it went into effect....

    • 00/09/16 PM doesn't want you to quit PM, Apr, 1992
        By 1992 it was solidly established that cigarettes kill consumers. Yet even in face of conclusive evidence that its consumers were likely to suffer cruel and suffocating deaths, the Philip Morris Tobacco Company (PM) didn't want smokers to quit. By 1992 a number of nicotine replacement therapies had entered the market. PM was clearly threatened by these "competitor" products which, as they coldly put it, would "accelerate decline of the cigarette industry" by "enhanc[ing] the success rate of quitters who permanently leave smoking." Moreover, PM kept track of what they termed the "Gross Industry Smoker Loss" they incurred due to the nicotine replacement patch products storming onto the market. Hmmm....according to recent commercials, PM feeds the hungry, brings water to flood victims and supports domestic violence shelters. Pretty socially conscious company, right? But wouldn't you think that a truly socially conscious company would be just a little bit kinder to their own consumers, the millions of addicted smokers out there who are desperately seeking ways to avert an early death?
          Approximately 23% or 11.7 million smokers try to quit every year. 3.5 million claim to quit in the past year. 2.4 million stay quit for the year. Nicotine patch could potentially accelerate decline of cigarette industry in several ways
          Encourage more smokers to try to quit
          Enable more triers to actually quit
          Enhance success rate of quitters who permanently leave smoking

    • 00/09/13 Ode to PM (a.k.a. 'Crackpot letter')PM, Feb 11, 1986
        Philip Morris's legal department keeps an entertaining file entitled "Crack Pot Letters." It contains some amazing stuff. Following is a unique and powerful ode penned by a gentleman from Michigan who seems to have a good grip on tobacco issues. . .

          The soothing taste of your despicable ware
          Rolled and sold by those who don't care
          Centuries ago a ritual of peace
          You've turned into a murdering thief . . .

          Your advertisers prey on dreams they invent
          To ride the wide range is the road to content
          Millions of dollars and millions of lives
          Pave the road you've built over those who have died

    • 00/09/11 Less Educated: Today's Trend, Tomorrow's Market RJR, 1985
        Less educated people are more likely to smoke, and the tobacco industry preys upon the less educated as target markets for their products. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the R.J. Reynolds document, " Less Educated: Today's Trend, Tomorrow's Market," which gives us insight into the sociological observation and the depth of scrutiny that cigarette companies give their most productive markets. The document portrays "acceptance of purposelessness" as a "trend" for the less educated. One charts shows that Marlboro, Winston and KOOL are the cigarettes of the younger and less educated population sectors. . . Furthermore, the writer discusses the need to target the wants of the less educated for "style, prestige and status," outlining how RJR should "leverage" the psychological needs of this group:
          Need for self-esteem, Need to feel in control, Need for security, Need for structure.
        People are likely to say there is nothing new or unique about the fact that companies evaluate their markets, but how many members of the consuming public have actually been privy to these evaluations? How many have actually gotten to see how major corporations analyze, study, classify and ultimately regard their consumers? Thanks to the release of the tobacco industry's documents, we now have access to a large cache of such information.

    • 00/09/09 PM on Nicotine and heart disease PM, Mar 26, 1980
        In this Philip Morris (PM) internal memo, PM scientist Ray Fagan indicates that nicotine may lower the heart's threshold to ventricular fibrillation, an inefficient pumping mode wherein the heart "flutters" and fails to pump blood efficiently. Fagan further observes that this condition can result in sudden death:
          This type of arrythmia is frequently the cause of sudden death in cardiovascular disease.

    • 00/09/04 PM, Nov 1, 1972: 'Sounds like cigarettes are addicting...'
        This 1972 Philip Morris (PM) internal memo, Electromyographic Studies of Muscle Relaxation in Smokers, establishes the fact that PM knew that cigarettes were addicting way back in 1972, fully 22 years before the '94 congressional hearings wherein the tobacco CEOs testified that they didn't believe nicotine was addicting. This PM employee states quite frankly that:
          What it sounds like at the moment is that cigarets are addicting and the reaction of the inveterate cigaret smoker is like that of any drug addict.
        Also note the PM employee's understanding that his company lacked a reputation for "'intellectual honesty and integrity" when it came to scientific research, as he intimates that tobacco industry-financing for the study would have to be hidden from the public view if they intended to "market" the results of this proposed study:
          The market promotion value of this work, assuming it is valid, may be negated by the fact that it was done in an independent institute financed by a cigaret manufacturer or by the tobacco industry. Only if the work were done under the auspices of an institution with a well-established reputation for intellectual honesty and integrity would this be worthwhile.

    • 00/08/30 RJR's crack-puffing baboons RJR, Feb 9, 1989
        RJR hired a research lab to do an experiment. In the experiment, they made baboons smoke Premier cigarettes laced with crack cocaine, and then they analyzed the animals' blood for cocaine content. The reason for this bizarre experiment became clear after reading the conclusions of the scientist who conducted the test: it was to find out whether the Premier cigarette functioned adequately a drug delivery device. . .. From the phrasing of the conclusion, it was apparent that RJR hoped that a substantial amount of cocaine would be found in the baboons' blood after smoking the crack-laden Premier cigarettes. Note this apology by the scientist conducting the experiment:
          I am sorry to hear that the samples from the animals who smoke Premier cigarettes loaded with crack were relatively low in cocaine content...I listed several possible interpretations [of why this might be the case], including: ... 4) The Premier really does not serve as a drug delivery device.
        Since the tobacco companies insist that cigarettes aren't drug delivery devices (and indeed they fought this charge very strongly at the FDA), you would think the RJR Tobacco Company would have been happy about these findings-- wouldn't you?

    • 00/08/27 Roper to the rescue TI
        It appears that beyond the functions of just taking polls and doing surveys, however, the Roper organization actually took it upon itself to design studies that would return beneficial results for the tobacco industry. . . This is a proposal from the Roper Organization to do a study that would help diffuse the charge that smoking leads to death by returning results supportive of the Tobacco Institute's "Constitutional theory"--that is, the theory that it is the fault of the smoker that he gets sick and dies, and not the fault of the cigarette or manufacturer. The "Constitutional Theory" asserted that smokers had some sort of biological defect that predisposed them to excess, e.g., caused them to live hard, drive fast, eat too many achovies, get divorced, and generally feel more stress than nonsmokers, etc.
          However, as a result of many years of work in the tobacco field, some of it for the Tobacco Institute, we have developed a different thesis that we think merits testing. . . It is our thesis that if a proper study were done, a type of person who is inclined towards excesses could be identified and described and that cigarette smoking would merely be one of many "symptoms" that would identify such a person. If true, such a study would: a) help to establish the smoking and health data as associative, not necessarily causative; and b) suggest the desirability of future research, medical and otherwise, on the constitutional theory--the kinds of people that are inclined towards excesses, and ultimately whether the excesses are merely descriptive or may be contributory, if not directly causative. . . We propose a large sample for the conduct of this study.... It will have to be large...in order to be psychologically impressive.

    • 00/08/23 PM's Global ETS Conspiracy PM, Feb 17, 1988
        This amazing document reveals Philip Morris (PM) as the ringleader in a global conspiracy to create and maintain a controversy about the health effects of environmental tobacco smoke (ETS). The project, (conceived by Philip Morris and later named "The Whitecoat Project" after the white coats that scientists wear) proved to be a tremendously expensive undertaking, even for PM. To this end, PM arranged this 1988 meeting to describe their plan to their British counterparts and then to solicit financial support for their activities:
          Philip Morris presented to the UK industry their global strategy on environmental tobacco smoke. In every major international area (USA, Europe, Australia, Far East, South America, Central American and Spain) they are proposing, in key countries, to set up a team of scientists organized by one national coordinating scientist and American lawyers, to review scientific literature or carry out work on ETS to keep the controversy alive...
        This document, and others discovered by ASH UK that prove that PM actually carried out these plans, vindicate public health workers who have so long been working to warn the world's populace about the dangers of secondhand tobacco smoke. When up against the clandestine global effort of the Philip Morris Tobacco to obscure the truth, however, it has been nothing short of an epic battle. The efforts of Philip Morris have left the world's people decades behind where they should be in eliminating people's exposure to ETS

    • 00/08/22 Image of Feminine Cigarettes? Trailer Trash, chemicalsT PM, Dec, 1991
        This is a report of a 1994 focus group session done for Philip Morris to investigate what sort of images women have of "feminine" cigarette brands, like Misty and Virginia Slims. On page 6 is a section entitled, The Image of Specific Brands. In this exercise, women were asked to report the key types of images they had for each given brand of cigarette (a kind of "free association" exercise). I was taken by the strongly negative images that these women associate with almost all brands of cigarettes! A few images these women associated with "feminine" cigarette brands included: "grandma," "tacky," "cheap," "chemical," "asbestos," "Jesse Helms," and "trailer trash."

    • 00/08/19 PM, 1994: PM: Smoking bans lead to 20% quit rate
        States and countries that want to reduce smoking among their citizens need look no further than this conclusive acknowledgment by the Philip Morris Tobacco Company (PM) that workplace smoking bans lead to a 20% Quit Rate among cigarette consumers. What better way than to use PM's own data to show legislators that workplace smoking bans definitely do achieve a higher quit rate among citizens. (Thanks, PM!) Plus, since about 80% of smokers want to quit, a statewide workplace smoking restriction law would be invaluable in helping these citizens exercise their freedom of choice.
          Fact: Bans/Restrictions Affect Consumption: 20% Quit Rate w/ U.S. Workplace Bans Increasing Restrictions will have negative impact on P/L [profit/loss] . . Conclusion: . . --[smoking bans have] a Big and Direct Impact on bottom line and is Potentially Irreversible.

    • 00/08/18 'Medical Experts' say ditch stronger health warnings TI, Apr 30, 1969
        Given the conclusive evidence we now have that smoking is the leading cause of preventable death worldwide, and given the growing epidemic of tobacco-induced illness worldwide, the testimony of these distinguished "medical experts" for the Tobacco Institute is amazing and utterly shameful. How many lives could have been saved if "distinguished medical experts" like these had not given such grossly misleading testimony to the government and the public? Doris L. Herman, M.D., a Los Angeles pathologist, A former president of the American Medical Women's Association, Dr. Bernice C. Sachs of Seattle, dean of Perugia University Medical School, Dr. Lucio Soveri, a pathologist, Travis W. Winsor, M.D., a University of Southern California heart specialist
          Joshua Harold Burn, M.D., former head of the pharmacology department at Oxford and a visiting professor at Washington University in St. Louis, told the committee that "there is a growing body of evidence that nicotine is stimulating and useful to man" in the amounts found in cigarettes. . . A Chicago physician said the same thing about atherosclerosis, another illness which has been statistically associated with smoking. Dr. Walter S. Priest, a professer-emeritus of medicine, warned of "psychic trauma" if smokers are continually confronted with unreasonably frightening warnings.

    • 00/08/15 PM's battle plan against health PM, 1994
        Here is Philip Morris' (PM) definitive battle plan outline for use against governments and health advocates worldwide. . . It is interesting that in this document PM refers to tobacco control advocates as "competitors" rather than adversaries. In their view, health advocates threaten to take away their market share, just as another cigarette company would. It is also interesting to see how PM considers itself virtually alone in this epic battle. Taking note of the dismal lack of support and coordination it has achieved with the other cigarette makers in its quest to obfucate truth, the writer comments that "PM Appears to be Driving the Industry both issue-wise, Dollar-wise, and political-wise." People who are familiar with the industry's documents see that indeed this true. Far beyond any other company, PM has a reputation of pouring money into the creation of front groups, "instructing" the media, recruiting third parties to fight its battles, finding and supporting scientists to help them "prolong the controversy" about secondhand smoke, etc. It appears from the documents that no other company has engaged to such an extreme extent in so many activities aimed at thwarting public health efforts. . . PM's overall assessment of the increasing social unacceptability of smoking concludes that "Perception is Reality." The next goal goes on to state that PM must dedicate its resources to altering perceptions. Would it be possible that the goal of the all-powerful PM, then, is to alter our reality?"

    • 00/08/13 Philip Morris yields to blackmail PM, Oct 12, 1979
        Dr. Schmaehl was a German scientist charged with researching how to reduce the biological activity of cigarette tars, with an eye towards producing a safer cigarette. When told suddenly in 1979 that Philip Morris would cease supporting this research financially, Dr. Schmael wrote a powerful letter to his superior saying that the studies are vital and if PM refused to finance the studies, he would perform them himself outside of the influence of the industry and publish the results, which would include the brand names of the cigarettes he studied. Dr. Schmael's alarming letter was quickly translated into English and a copy sent to Thomas Osdene, research director at Philip Morris. Osdene quickly referred it to Alex Holtzman, Associate General Counsel for Philip Morris, who said of the letter:
          I do feel that this letter is tantamount to blackmail by Schmaehl. I am very much afraid that unless financial support be provided to Schmaehl he will chastise the industry.
        Upon being confronted with what PM termed internally as blackmail, the company made the decision to capitulate! They decided to continue to fund Schmael's studies, hoping the situation would not continue forever.

    • 00/08/03 PM's youth programs: for Wall Street, investors PM, Jul, 1994
        This document reveals one more reason Philip Morris so strongly promotes its own "youth programs": to convince Wall Street, its stockholders and investors that PM is a good investment," and that
          PM is a responsible and open corporation that can deal with 'the issues' without outside intervention.
        [Note how PM sarcastically offsets "the issues" in quotation marks. Could this indicate PM doesn't consider youth smoking to be a "real" issue?]

    • 00/08/02 Philip Morris' 1994 'Sound Science Project' PM, Jun 17, 1994
        Today's document shows Philip Morris using its public relations company, Burson Marsteller (BM), to organize yet another one of these "sound science" front groups to allow PM to favorably influence politicians and disseminate its own information about the health effects of its products in Europe. PM and BM worked to hide the extensive Philip Morris involvement in assembling the "Sound Science Project" of 1994. Even the scientists who were approached for the project were skeptical of tobacco industry (and specifically Philip Morris) involvement, as this document frankly notes: ...some of the scientists have themselves raised the questions of relations to the tobacco industry as a critical issue.... BM also noted how disclosure of PM involvement could doom the entire plan:
          Please note that you must not use the outcome of ...the interviews with scientists in a Philip Morris approach to the identified scientists because that could distort and jeopardize the entire operation..."
        Moreover, BM worked to persuade companies other than Philip Morris to act co-sponsors of the "Sound Science Project," for, as they noted, if people detected that PM was the only sponsor of these seminars, the credibility of the scientists, and the entire project, would go out the window:
          It is absolutely vital that we succeed in getting funding of the seminar from a broader group of sponsors than just PM...because otherwise we would not be able to ensure the credibility of the seminar in relation to the scientists. And if the seminar has not got that credibility, then outcomes of the meeting will not have great value.

    • 00/08/01 PM calaculates Italian smoking trendsPM, Jul 28, 1986
        Isn't it strange . . . that just a few short years ago PM's calculation of future cigarette consumption in Italy would be based in part on the cigarette consumption of what PM itself it refers to as "underage smokers," and would discuss,
          The youngest adult segment, ages 15-24
        PM also acknowledges that anti-smoking campaigns and social pressures really do work to lower the smoking rate,
          Anti-smoking campaigns and social pressure against smoking influence the numbers of people who stop smoking
        but the document also says that PM needn't worry too much about this because,
          In the medium term the effect [of these campaigns and social pressures] will not be as strong because of the existence of a large reserve of young smokers.
        PM also discusses how the symbolism of smoking is an important marketing tool influencing youngsters to smoke:
          Smoking has been a symbol of emancipation and has been a very important factor influencing those who start smoking.

    • 00/07/29 Walgreens: Ally of the Tobacco Institute TI, Mar 16, 1977
        The Tobacco Institute engaged retailers--including health-related establishments like drug stores - to defend the tobacco industry in the "smoking and health controversy." A confidential 1977 memo to William Kloepfer (of the Tobacco Institute) from Horace Kornegay (also of the TI) discusses the possibility that the Walgreens Drugstore chain may help them promote disinformation about the link cigarettes and health . . . Indeed, the Tobacco Institute pursued their plan, sending a letter to Walgreens describing how Majik Markets had helped them, and proposing Walgreens do the same (at TI expense) . . . Walgreens was extremely eager to help:
          We are exploring the possibilities of an information program which will help both the tobacco industry and ourselves... [a]s an established "health center", there are many, many things we can do to "gain and maintain the understanding and support of the public.

    • 00/07/31 Health warnings sell cigarettes PM, Oct 19, 1973
        Overseas, mandatory health warnings that the industry had to place on American cigarettes proved to be a boon. The warnings assured overseas buyers that the cigarettes were the genuine article, really coming from the U.S.A., so demand for cigarettes with warnings on them increased.
          The thought occurs to me that practically the whole world now knows that both British and American cigarettes carry a warning notice. As far as I know, no other brands carry any particular legend except "made in U.S.A." in small letters and the ultimate consumers might smoke more of these health notice cigarettes, because they are assured by the notice that they are American made.

    • 00/07/23 PM Marketing Marlboros in Vietnam PM, Jun, 1994
        Philip Morris made plans to market Marlboro cigarettes in Vietnam, noting that it was illegal to sell foreign cigarettes there ("Need to manufacture locally to properly market Marlboro in Vietnam"). They also noted that cigarette advertising was prohibited in Vietnamese media, that the smoking rate among Vietnamese men was a phenomenal 80%, that the overall smoking rate among adults was 40% . . . that the average per capita income in Vietnam was US $220 per year, that a pack of cigarettes sold for $1.00, and the average Vietnamese smoker smoked 11 "sticks" (cigarettes) per day. If one does the math, though, one finds the average Vietnamese smoker spending an amount almost equal to his annual per capita income on cigarettes each year... (about US $200).

    • 00/07/26 PM's ETS Plan, Nordic Area '87 PM, 1987
        This report outlines, bullet by bullet, PM's hard-hitting corporate plan to attack the secondhand smoke issue in northern Europe. Aimed at reversing the declining social acceptability of smoking in the Nordic area, it includes crafting a "second opinion" about the health effects of ETS, "building smokers' self-esteem," creating an "airline milieu" to use as a venue for offering their own information, putting on "healthy building seminars" using Gray Robertson's company, ACVA (which later became Healthy Buildings International, after Philip Morris took it over) and an extensive media plan for assuring that PM's point of view stretches to reach virtually every citizen of northern Europe--without a single soul knowing that it is PM's point of view. The entire document is spectacular in its own right for the level of detail it reveals about PM's all-encompassing battle tactics to fight health measures. Their plans even include a diversionary "white-hat" proposal for currying favor among Nordic-area politicians while they clandestinely fight pro-health legislation:
          Prepare plan for approaching other issues in society (AIDS, traffic, etc.), offering statistical material and helping them to get more funds for their projects. . . 4. Build IAQ [indoor air quality] industry and science without visible tobacco industry presence.

    • 00/07/21 Blaming the smoker BAT
        This British American Tobacco Company document explores several working hypotheses that were under consideration by the Tobacco Research Council (TRC), an industry group that charged itself with discovering "what really causes cancer." Naturally, one of the hypotheses of the industry was that the smoker causes his own cancer due to his/her genetic makeup. If they could only find out who was predisposed to getting cancer, and then persuade these people not to smoke, then --voila'!--they could completely eliminate the statistical association between smoking and lung cancer! This document also gives us an example of which "eminent research workers" the members of the TRC held in high esteem. . .
          One of the most eminent research workers in the field of nicotine and cardiovascular disease, Dr. Richard Bing of Detroit, has said, 'I think that it is all right for a healthy man to smoke as far as the heart is concerned because, just like bicycling, it increases coronary flow -- and it is a lot easier because one can do it lying down.'

    • 00/07/13 RJR on the psychological needs of children RJR, Jul 3, 1974
        This document shows how closely the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company dissected the psychological needs of children, understanding how desperately they need to gain confidence, bolster their self-image, cope with boredom, conform with peers, appear sexually precocious, cope with life's transitions, and be respected as a grown up. What is a society to do when they find out, as we have, that corporations hawking addictive, deadly products have a microscope on the psychological needs of children in this manner?

    • 00/07/12 PM: dogs, rats, smokers PM, Oct 19, 1977
        Smokers and rats have a lot in common, according to Philip Morris. A rat can be taught to push a lever to get a food pellet, and a smoker can be taught to pull out a cigarette and smoke it for his "reward." Likewise, just as Pavlov's dog could be taught to salivate at the mere sound of a bell, so can a smoker be conditioned. According to Philip Morris, these are the socio-psychological aspects of smoking... This document contains the musings not of a mad scientist, but of a Philip Morris (PM) researcher charged with figuring out exactly what makes smokers smoke--so PM can do more of it. The researcher explains why PM needs to study the brainwaves, blood nicotine levels and central nervous systems of smokers: so they can find out how to increase the smokers' "rewards." Sounds a lot like doctors talking about treating a patient, doesn't it? There are only a few differences: there is no doctor's license required, there is no oversight, no limit on types or quantities of chemicals that can be used... and, in fact, there are NO regulations here AT ALL. The tobacco industry has free reign to manipulate people's bodies whatever way they see fit to make them buy more cigarettes. They are a self-styled pharmaceutical agent with no rules being applied. This document says quite clearly that Philip Morris' charter is to:
          Study the psychology of the smoker in search of information that can increase corporate profits.

    • 00/07/10 Philip Morris considers smear tactics PM, Mar 29, 1985
        Philip Morris Tobacco Company's (PM) top management contemplated using smear tactics to deter the most effective public health advocates. A quote from this document targets John Banhaf, the attorney who successfully applied the Fairness Doctrine to get the first anti-smoking ads on TV in the late 1960s. In exploring ways they could cool the zeal of tobacco control advocates, this PM document states:
          Possibly, too, we can discredit our critics. John Banzhaf for example, is alleged to be involved in the porno industry. Can't we use this somehow? If we start to dig around, we will certainly find anomalies which we can exploit...
        Another idea was to commission the writing of a book on the "anti-industry industry" to show the public how much money tobacco control advocates are making off their pursuits (!) But perhaps most prophetic statement (in light of the current punitive damages phase of the Engle trial in Florida) is the line saying that they have
          to work to establish a mind-set in the public at large that bankrupting huge industries such as tobacco is unthinkable....It just has to be possible to demonstrate that large industries cannot be made to disappear without extremely grave consequences...

    • 00/06/27 Methyl Bromide residue on tobacco PM, Oct 10, 1983
        Methyl bromide is a highly toxic fumigant used within the tobacco industry to control an insect called "cigarette beetle." It has no warning properties, such as smell, taste or color. Today's document says, among other things, that "When heated to decomposition, [methyl bromide] emits highly toxic fumes of bromides." Of course, this would be the fate of any residues remaining on tobacco leaves that makes it into cigarettes. It also says that the most significant route of exposure of methyl bromide is through the lungs. A 1984 Philip Morris internal memo reveals the concern within Philip Morris about use of this potent chemical poison:
          Recently, there have been more rumblings about methyl bromide at the EPA, and I enclose a portion of the letter...which was sent by the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc...On page 2,...the Council makes some statement about methyl bromide's toxicity. I bring this to your attention to focus once again on the need to remove methyl bromide from our tobacco processing operations.

    • 00/06/26 The tobacco industry and African Americans Lorillard, Jun 22, 1984
        This is a letter from the president of Black Media, Inc. (a New York City-based African-American media company) to the vice president of the Philip Morris Tobacco Company, an apparent response to a solicitation for general support from the African-American community. I found this letter surprising for the extremely fervent support it shows that the African American community gave the tobacco industry (particularly surprising in light of the "Uptown Revolt" that occured just a few short years later). . . In empathizing so strontly with the tobacco industry's woes, however, the writer of this letter goes so far as to compare the prejudice and racial bigotry suffered by African Americans with the strong anti-tobacco sentiment welling up in the U.S.:
          ...because we as Black Americans have long felt the brutal blows of bold, bigoted and unbecoming behavior. In other words, we are in a position such that we can empathize almost totally with you.
        This letter indicates that a very powerful vein of support for Big Tobacco emanated (and may still emanate) from some facets of the African-American community.

    • 00/06/25 Duping "YAMS" with DavePM, Aug 10, 1994
        Philip Morris was faced with a marketing dilemma: the newest generation of nicotine addicts, "Generation Xers," was growing up. Gen X'ers are very conscious of logos and name-brands, especially males (or, as PM refers to them, YAMS - Young Adult Male Smokers). YAMS must have the highest quality and authenticity in everything they buy. The problem is, YAMS are cheap, broke and desperate. How can a Gen-X YAM possibly feel good about smoking (or feel good about himself) when he is relegated to purchasing those cheap, discount cigarettes with staid, generic names like "Basic" and "GPC"? He can't. In order to win this crowd's business, PM had to make it emotionally easy for Gen-Xers to buy Philip Morris' deeply-discounted cigs. This called for all new imagery, attached to a whole new brand of cigarettes--one made by a cool, young, honest, authentic, trustworthy and hard-working guy (with a pickup truck!) named "Dave."
          In their heart of hearts, they would like to feel that when they buy a discount brand, it's because they choose to -- not because they happen to be cheap, broke, or desperate. . . While speaking to YAMS in their language, Dave further strengthens the emotional connection, trust and belief in his product.

    • 00/06/22 High cig prices stimulate quitting PM, Mar 4, 1993
        For a government bearing the costs of smoking, one way to recoup those cost while simultaneously helping more people quit smoking would be to increase the taxes on cigarettes. Philip Morris (who analyzes every marketing quirk, including what makes people quit smoking ) confirms this and makes the case for increased tobacco taxes very well by confirming that:
          A high cigarette price, more than any other cigarette attribute, has the most dramatic impact on the share of the quitting population.

    • 00/06/21 The Development of Tobacco Industry Strategy TI, Apr 16, 1982
        This document shows: 1) That the tobacco companies joined together to employ a unified strategy in facing its multiple challenges, 2) That they considered public health efforts to be a threat to their products, and felt such a threat needed to be counteracted as though a mere political game, 3) That their "solution" was implementing "good guy" public relations programs, including "youth programs." Far from implementing socially-conscious programs for altruistic reasons, the tobacco industry says quite plainly:
          The potential positive outcomes of [the tobacco industry] adopting [socially-conscious] programs of this nature may be: * increased goodwill and reputation of the tobacco industry... * the ability to affect the problem areas that most concern the tobacco industry and simultaneously obtain tax benefits * a more sophisticated understanding by government of the needs/behaviors of industry. For example, a program to discourage teens from smoking...might prevent or delay further regulation of the tobacco industry. A fire safety program which emphasizes all potential fire hazards would demonstrate the industry's concern for public safety.

    • 00/06/19 Marlboro advertising in Beirut PM, Jul, 1993
        While reading this document it occurred to me that Philip Morris' (PM) actually uses the poverty of these countries to allow them to plunge their advertising more deeply into these cultures. For example, these countries lack sufficient funds for public works, like refurbishing bridges and sidewalks and adding lighting to underground tunnels. This was an opportunity for PM to engage in a sort of "public-works advertising." They would provide funds to refurbish these bridges, roundabouts and pedestrian-ways and add lighting to the dark tunnels in Beirut in exchange for the ability to place large, prominent "Marlboro" signage ("branding") at the entrances to these tunnels, bridges, etc. What underfunded municipality wouldn't drool at such an offer of financial assistance to help "improve" their town in exchange for a mere sign? Furthermore, PM planned to place its "Marlboro" logos on roadways where they would be adjacent to public signage imploring people to "Drive Safely" and "Walk Safely." Hmmmm...could it be that the placement of the "Marlboro" logo adjacent to messages of safety is an accident? Not according to this document.
          Marlboro Tunnel Entrance Branding: Placement of Marlboro branding at the entrance of two major tunnels with "Drive Safely" statements. Tunnel's illumination system to be provided by PM in return for the placement of previously mentioned signs. . . Marlboro Pedestrian Bridge Branding: Refurbishment of 5 pedestrian bridges within the Greater Beirut area in return for which MARLBORO branded signs would be placed with "Walk Safely" statements.

    • 00/06/20 Negro smokers and menthol PM, Sep, 1968
        This Philip Morris paper documents a 1968 focus group session held with African-American smokers to probe their attitudes towards menthol cigarettes. Perhaps most interesting was the realization that many smokers "discover" menthol cigarettes when they are sick--have a cold or sore throat. Also, people in this focus group understood that smoking was unhealthy, but they were also under the impression that menthol cigarettes were "better" for their health than regular cigarettes. The realization by Philip Morris that this belief was widespread, and their subesquent lack of corporate action to correct this misinformation, could be considered a crime against society.
          There are indications that menthols tend to be considered as generally "better for one's health." That impression refers not only to the health of the respiratory tract, but the whole organism. The majority view is that menthols are "less strong" and regular cigarettes, and that a cigarette which is "less strong" is better for a person's health.

    • 00/06/18 PM/TI Corporate affairs: Italy PM/TI, Aug 24, 1994
        The multinational tobacco companies came together to form a European version of the Tobacco Institute called the "Zurich Club," whose purpose was to address environmental tobacco smoke (ETS), social acceptability and advertising issues in Europe. One of the stated objectives of the Zurich Club was to "Develop pro-smoking groups in principal Italian cities." . . The Zurich Club was funded by Philip Morris (PM), R.J. Reynolds (RJR), British American Tobacco Corporation (BAT) and the Rothman's and Reentsma tobacco companies. . . The Zurich Club's influence in Italy was tremendous. It influenced media and government by providing politicians and journalists with free trips to the Grand Prix, Golf World Cup Roma, motorcycling events, sailing events, other sports and cultural events--and also free visits to their cigarette factories. It also provided a Christmas party for all Italian journalists, created a book, "Sketches of Smoke" ("a photography book covering all the most popular past and present smokers, taken by the greatest photographers in the world"), and gave out corporate gifts. The writer of this memo recommends that PM "participate actively" as "ghost leaders" of associations and cultural institutes in order to "[increase our] network of political contacts and promote PM as an outstanding and socially involved company."

    • 00/06/14 1 person, 672 callsTI, Sep 14, 1989
        This untitled, handwritten letter reveals an individual attempting to influence a phone-in television news poll that asked viewers to call in and say whether they favored banning smoking on airline flights or not. This informant reports that NO smokers the TV station interviewed at the airport responded that they would stop flying if a smoking ban was enacted.
          I phoned in 100 times and got the "beep" indicating vote recorded. A friend called in 672 times! I didn't tune into KOMO-TV until around 6:30 PM and as I recall, the poll was 60/40 then! Why no changes by next morning?
        It is a homage to tobacco control efforts that two pro-tobacco activists can generate 772 calls to a phone-in poll in Seatlle in 1989 and the results STILL reflected a landslide in favor of smoking restrictions.

    • 00/06/14 PM front group: MN Coalition of Responsible Retailers PM, 1992
        In the early 1990s, Minnesotans were successfully enacting tobacco control measures in their communities and the tobacco industry was incurring important losses at both the local and state levels in Minnesota. Something had to be done. The tobacco industry couldn't just LET people enact laws of their own choosing. Existing retail organizations were just not doing Philip Morris' (PM's) bidding. Worse, tobacco was just not a top priority for most of Minnesota's retailers, who were concerned about many other issues as well. To remedy this situation, PM took it upon itself to organize a new statewide retailer coalition (with the trust-inducing name), the "Minnesota Coalition of Responsible Retailers," expressly for the purpose of defeating tobacco control ordinances at the local level throughout Minnesota. Today's featured document is a joint proposal from a public relations specialist and an attorney to organize this group for PM. . . Question: How many other states have Philip Morris-created "retailer coalitions" that exist expressly to oppose ordinances requested by citizens to control the spread of deadly, addictive products within their communities?

    • 00/06/12 PM: Chew causes cancer (1982) PM, Apr 8, 1982
        In this personal and confidential internal Philip Morris (PM) memo from 1982, PM's highest-ranking officers reveal their complete awareness of, as they put it, the "untoward biological effects" of smokeless tobacco. In this memo the Director of Research at Philip Morris actually goes so far as to tell PM's Chief Executive Officer: "I believe the correlation between use of [smokeless tobacco] and oral cancer is quite strong..." Yet despite this clear acknowledgment (behind closed doors) of the correlation between chewing tobacco and the onset of oral cancer, "scientific witnesses" from the Smokeless Tobacco Council insisted in a 1985 Reader's Digest article that "no undisputed scientific evidence exists proving its product causes any human disease..." That article was entitled "Sean Marsee's Smokeless Death," and described the ordeal of a high school track star from Oklahoma who died of oral cancer at age 19 after using spit tobacco from the age of 12.
          In response to your request of March 29th, I have had a search made on the biological effects of smokeless tobacco which would include fine cut chewing tobacco, moist snuff and other related products. As you will see from the attached paper, there are a number of untoward biological effects associated with these materials. I believe the correlation between use of these substances and oral cancer is quite strong.

    • 00/06/10 Philip Morris on economics of smoking bans PM, Jul 8, 1994
          ...the economic arguments often used by the industry to scare off smoking ban activity were no longer working, if indeed they ever did. These arguments simply had no credibility with the public, which isn't surprising when you consider our dire predictions in the past rarely came true.

        PM's answer to the onslaught of popular smoking ban efforts, though, is to remove people's rights at the state level (preemption). PM's multi-pronged strategy to fight local clean-indoor air efforts, according to this document, is as follows:
        • Step 1) Introduce legislation to scatter the antis' resources,
        • Step 2) Pursue "accommodation" laws in a few localities to divert the anti's resources,
        • Step 3) Slap a lawsuit on a large city that enacts a smoking ban so it serves as an example to leaders of other towns the "trouble" they, too, will bring upon themselves if they are so brash as to yield to their citizens' desires for a clean indoor air ordinance, and
        • Step 4) Place a Philip Morris initiative on the state ballot.

        This is a straightforward example of corporate abuse of the initiative system for profit protection.

        PM's reasons for fighting smoking bans are also contained here. As Tina Walls (Vice-President of PM State Government Affairs) put it on page one of this document:
          The immediate implication [of smoking bans] for our business is clear: if our consumers have fewer opportunities to enjoy our products, they will use them less frequently and the result will be an adverse impact on our bottom line.

    • 00/06/04 Minnesota Legislative Action Plan PM, Oct 1987
        This report discusses the reasons why things weren't going the tobacco industry's way in Minnesota, and what they planned about it. It is a road map for how to control Minnesota's state legislature and the media.
          From April 6, 1987, to adjournment, a continuous, six-day-per-week phone bank was targeted specifically to Tax Committee members in the House and Senate. This...coordinated stream of calls was directed to retailers, wholesalers, all retail tobacco licensees and local activists. An initial 6,700 post cards were mailed to selected retail contacts supplied by R.J. Reynolds. An extensive letter-writing program was generated by Philip Morris... A second wave of Philip Morris targeted letter-writing was a mailing of 10,000 packets to previous volunteers urging hand-written letters to legislators in both houses... The third wave of Philip Morris targeted letter-writing was a re-contact program...Even though we blanketed the state with industry-generated, professionally prepared, targeted and timed grassroots activity, the missing factor was the human component.

    • 00/06/03 Radioactive Cigarettes PM, Apr 2, 1980
        This confidential Philip Morris (PM) memorandum from 1980 reveals that PM knew that smoke from their cigarettes contained radioactive lead and polonium, and that it was derived from the uranium in the calcium phosphate fertilizers that were regularly used on tobacco-growing soils. As the writer of this memo states most straightforwardly, 210-Pb [radioactive lead] and 210-Po [radioactive polonium] are present in tobacco and smoke.... They also knew that switching to another fertilizer could probably help the situation. Here's what they had to say about that: "..using ammonium phosphate instead of calcium phosphate as fertilizer is probably a valid but expensive point....

    • 00/06/02 Tort Reform is a Philip Morris program PM, 1996
        This document is a timeline for implementation of Philip Morris' key proactive programs. It reveals that tort reform is actually a program of the Philip Morris Tobacco Company (PM)! Tort reform is altering the rules of the American justice system to better suit PM's corporate interests. PM implemented tort reform alongside its "Preemption/Accommodation program," the goal of which was to enact state laws that eliminate cities' and towns' rights to enact their own, more restrctive laws regulating smoking behavior and cigarette sales.

    • 00/06/01 "Make our hat whiter, theirs blacker"TI, Jun 13, 1996
        This document provides a road map of how the tobacco industry defeats initiatives to increase taxes on cigarettes. The document, Proposed Advertising Strategy to Defeat Measure 70, is authored by "Fairness Matters to Oregonians." "Fairness Matters" was a front group headed by Mark Nelson, the campaign director for the Tobacco Institute's Oregon Executive Committee, which was supported through contributions from Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, Lorillard and the American Tobacco Companies. Nelson also owned a company called Public Affairs Counsel (PAC), which contracted with tobacco companies to defeat ballot measures. In another document, Nelson boasts,
          PAC has successfully managed and defeated every anti-tobacco initiative put forward in Oregon since 1988.
        He also boasts that PAC "lobbies on behalf of RJR and the Southland Corporation."(PM 2062523122/3156, from 1/24/96)
          "Create an environment where there are some doctors on our side (of health care reform) and some doctors against us--make voters a little uneasy about who the good guys really are.

    • 00/05/30 "To Do" list for killing cig taxes (MN) TI, Mar 4, 1991
        As evidenced by the following quotes, the tobacco industry's actions include setting up fake "grassroots" campaigns to oppose the tax, ( "...A grassroots campaign utilizing the sales forces of the tobacco companies and wholesalers,"), setting up phone banks and employing the cigarette company's coupon stuffers to call legislators, and generating "fake" letters-to-the editor whose true origins are buried ("...Letters to the editor written by PM and signed by 3rd parties obtained by PM."), and, of course, by generating cynical "Thank You" letters written by cross-border cigarette retailers who could benefit from the increased business the tax might generate for them . . . It appears from this document that the considerable opposition to such a tax increase is generated, funded and orchestrated almost wholly by the tobacco industry. In the absence of the tobacco industry's meddling, one must wonder how easily such measures would pass?

    • 00/05/29 Philip Morris on "Pulmonary eroticism" PM, Jul 1, 1972
        In this fascinating paper by Philip Morris Tobacco Company's Research Center's William L. Dunn, the scientist hypothesizes that smoking is a sexual act. The author then expounds on this analogy to explain the virtues of nicotine and its role in human existence. . .
          1) No one has ever become a cigarette smoker by smoking cigarettes without nicotine. 2) Most of the physiological responses to inhaled smoke have been shown to be nicotine-related. 3) Despite many low nicotine brand entries into the market-place, none of them have captured a substantial segment of the market.... Why then is there not a market for nicotine per se, to be eaten, sucked, drunk, injected inserted or inhaled as a pure aerosol? The answer, and I feel quite strongly about this, is that the cigarette is in fact among the most awe-inspiring examples of the ingenuity of man.

    • 00/05/28 PM Padding the resultsPM, Feb 17, 1984
        The majority of people are nonsmokers. This was even true back in 1984. In addition, most people prefer to have clean, fresh air in enclosed spaces. So when the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) considered eliminating smoking in commercial aircraft cabins in 1984, how could it have been that fully 72% of people writing in about the proposed measure opposed it? This document shows how. Among the pile of letters in opposition to the smoking ban, the chairman of the CAB found one with the following printed on it, In preparing your letter, please use plain paper or personal letterhead and a plain envelope. Do not use Philip Morris letterhead or envelopes." . . . Q: In how many similar cases of proposed clean indoor measures has Philip Morris meddled in order to change the perception of public opinion on this subject?

    • 00/05/25 TI dream: curing acne? TI, Jun 19, 1974
        The tobacco industry spends millions of dollars on research that ironically reveals no link between smoking and cancer, and is of conspicuously little use and value overall. This would seem to the average person to be quite a waste of dollars. However, this document show a revealing rationale for why the tobacco industry saw fit to press on paying for what appeared to be fruitless research: if they could even just stumble upon a cure for some other minor malady, then at least they could get the victims of that malady on their side! This document is also interesting because it exposes the notion by industry executives that they would be well-served by setting up their own panel of scientific experts to evaluate, review and summarize their own fruitless, internally-funded research.
          I believe it will be difficult for the Industry to establish credibility unless the public knows that we have been and are continuing to try to find out what causes disease (specifically cancer) rather than to exonerate cigarettes. For instance, if we could even show that we had found a cure for acne we would at least have the acne victims on our side...

    • 00/05/19 Extramural & Defensive Activities: Strictly Confidential PM, Jul 8, 1983
        In this document, Philip Morris (PM) emerges not only as the "bully on the block" in our communities (as we try to obtain clean indoor air ordinances) but also among other tobacco companies. For example, note PM's objective:
          OBJECTIVE -2: The further extension and deepening of scientific contacts within NMA's [National Manufacturer's Associations] ...and industry organisations...in order to enhance PM leadership and and to make prevail PM policies, PM strategies and PM approaches to common problems.
        This document also shows that PM attempts to influence, if not control, the standardizing organizations that carry out measurements on cigarettes:
          OBJECTIVE -3: Further deepening of contacts by PM experts with standardising organizations and with institutions that carry out control measurements on cigarettes, ingredients or other relevant commodities in order to assure that PM products are measured correctly throughout the World...
        Also contained within this document is a clear admission that PM worked to influence the "free" science surrounding their products, by "modifyingthe opinions" of individual scientists and "preceding their interventions with government agencies.":
          A continuing effort to be made for contacting individual scientists or officials to modify their opinions, to precede their interventions with national government agencies and to activate other defensive industry responses through National Manufacturer's Associations (NMA's), Infotab, etc.

    • 00/05/18 BAT on smoking in the Year 2000 BAT, Apr 4, 1979
        This 1979 document lists the tobacco industry's predictions for the year 2000 about what they expect will affect their future sales and marketing worldwide. Note BAT's dependence upon the increasing smoking incidence among young women in Africa, Latin America and Asia to keep overall smoking incidence up in these areas (as per these quotes:)It is also clear that the industry used low tar products to "reassure" smokers who were concerned about health, to help make them more comfortable about maintaining their addiction
          Low tar products will eventually and substantially define the tobacco business. This will serve as an important mechanism for reassuring smokers.

    • 00/05/15 Dealing with Issues Indirectly: Constituencies PM, Sep 13, 1984
        This is a transcript of a workshop given at Philip Morris' (PM) 1984 Corporate Affairs World Conference in Rye Brook, New York, wherein PM employees got a lesson in how to work through third parties to achieve credibility, power, leverage and gain access to places they otherwise could never gain access. It is a fascinating look into the building blocks of Philip Morris' now widespread corporate strategy. As the speaker says, to be successful Philip Morris had to be willing to:
          ...create vehicles to ride on, to put things together in fact to invent things that didn't exist before, coalitions, associations, institutes, seminars, meetings, all kinds of things like that . . . Example. The self-extinguishing cigarette. Who would normally be involved in the self-extinguishing cigarette on the other side of the fence? Probably the fire-fighting community. As you know in the United States, we have put a huge amount of time into helping all the organized groups of professional and volunteer fire-fighters. They get such help from us that is monumental. And then when we need them to stand up and say, not cigarettes that cause fire in 99.9 percent of the cases, we get their cooperation. But that's because we have cultivated them helped them achieve some of their goals and we have seen that they are a potential enemy that has real credibility. That's the greatest credibility, your potential enemy. We had turned them around and made allies, third party defenders for ourselves.

    • 00/05/14 Philip Morris' public health foundation (Europe) PM, Sep 1, 1991
        In this document, PM's Dr. Helmut Gaisch proposes that PM form a foundation that would become THE definitive scientific and public health authority for all of Europe. PM's scientific Foundation would surpass the authority of even the World Health Organization, and position itself as THE source of information that politicians turn to for advice on question of public health and welfare. PM's foundation would be beyond reproach, bestowed with an extremely prestigious, politician-laden board that would place it out of reach from lowly political attacks and bestow it with authority." The Foundation would address "life-style advocacy programmes, questions of preservation of personal dignity, enjoyment of life and freedom of choice...(3) Environmental concerns....with regards to... personal well-being, recreational needs..." PM's aim was to create a powerful scientific authority that would enable it to manipulate public policy throughout Europe and achieve a lasting impact on society...

    • 00/05/13 Justifying The Social Cost PM, Nov. 20, 1978
        What the tobacco industry (TI) can and cannot discuss publicly receives quite a bit of consideration between the industry and its public relations arms. With regard to the "social costs" argument against smoking (the idea that smokers cost society more in lost work time, treatment, hospitalization, etc.), TI public relations firms like this one, Campbell Johnson, Ltd., mused that with a general lengthening of the expectation of life we really need something for people to die of. " To explain people's overall blase' reaction to information that tobacco can kill, Campbell Johnson explains to the Tobacco Advisory Council (TAC), that for the wealthier, more developed countries, in the absence of
          "[W]ar, poverty and starvation...cancer, as the disease of the rich... may have some predestined part to play. The argument is obviously not one that the tobacco industry could use publicly. But its weight, as a psychological factor in perpetuating people's taste for smoking as an enjoyable if risky habit, should not be under-estimated.

    • 00/05/10 "Operation Downunder's" European Counterpart PM, Feb 21, 1988
        This document reveals clearly that Philip Morris was the instigator in the conspiracy among the worldwide tobacco companies to cover up the health risks of secondhand smoke. Here's the definitive line from this document that makes this clear: The strategic objective for S&T PME is to go beyond the establishment of a controversy concerning an alleged ETS health risk but to disperse the suspicion of risk." The document also discusses PM's effort to pull other manufacturers into their plan to get assistance with funding, and their use of attorneys (Covington and Burling) as "intermediaries" in the cover-up. (Use of attorneys enabled them to label information about this project as confidential to protect it under "attorney-client privilege").

    • 00/05/04 The real reasons for 'youth programs'TI, Jan 29, 1991
        This helpful document explains the real reason why the tobacco industry has (and widely promotes) " youth programs." Such programs " ...support The Institute's objective of discouraging unfair and counterproductive federal, state and local restrictions on cigarette advertising..." They also have the purpose of " Reinforcing the belief that peer pressure - not advertising - is the cause of youth smoking." But most importantly, enacting and promoting youth programs assist them in " Seizing the political center and forcing the anti-smokers to an extreme... " The " fairly simple" strategy of the Tobacco Institute, in its own words, is to Bait anti-tobacco forces to criticize industry efforts. Focus media attention on anti's extremism. Anticipate and blunt antis' strongest points. and " Work with the through credible child welfare professionals and educators to tackle the 'problem,' " ...Note how the word " problem" is contained in quotation marks, as though it is not being taken seriously. Interestingly, nowhere in this document does it state that the purpose of their youth programs is to reduce youth smoking.

    • 00/05/03 The Roper Proposal PM, May 1, 1972:
        This memo was written by the Tobacco Institute's Vice President of Public Relations, Fred Panzer, in 1972. Mr. Panzer is concocting a way to prolong the "cigarette controversy" and thus turn around the "deteriorating situation" in which the tobacco industry found itself. . . The tobacco industry took polls which showed that idea #2 was the one that was most believable to most people. Thus, Mr. Panzer conceived of commissioning a "study" that would concur with, and promote this hypothesis. To give the study weight and credibility, it would be designed by "prestige figures" and "hopefully published by a legitimate house." It would then be delivered to the White House, Congress, the Cabinet, State Governors, the Senate, medical universities, etc. and then released in book form (both hard back and paper back). As a book, it would thus be easily promoted through all the legitimate avenues: talk shows, book reviews, interviews, ads, condensations in magazines, etc. Then, the key influentials and opinion leaders thus "educated," they would help buffalo millions of people into believing that indeed everything but smoking could be blamed for inducing smokers' illnesses.
          ..best of all, [the proposed book] would only have to be seen -- not read -- to be believed...just like the Surgeon General's report.
    • 00/05/01 L&M-1961: Pleasurable, poisonous, carcinogenic PM, Mar 15, 1961
        This confidential, "limited" Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Company document is a very straightforward confirmation that by 1961 the tobacco industry knew that:
          1. There are biologically active materials present in cigarette tobacco. These are: a) cancer causing b) cancer promoting c) poisonous d) stimulating, pleasurable, and flavorful.
        What's more, this industry consultant who wrote this paper used the terms "causative precursors in tobacco" and "causative agent products" several times in referring to the cancer-causing and promoting chemicals in their products. Publicly, though, at this same time the industry was creating doubt and "controversy" about the causation relationship between tobacco use and illness... Even despite this very clear and early acknowledgment of the health effects of their products, tobacco companies still oppose cancer victims in court, and try to create doubt that tobacco products could have contributed to the victims' cancers.

    • 00/04/30 "Reducing" tar levels PM, Apr 19, 1993
        This telex from the Philip Morris (PM) document site reveals how PM "cooperated" with the European Economic Community's (EEC) mandate to reduce tar levels in cigarettes--without actually reducing tar levels at all. Instead, they offered to standardize the procedures used among 23 European countries to test for tar levels. It took them three years to do this, but by doing so, they and managed to develop a new testing procedure that reported lower tar levels in their products by 1 milligram--without any real change in the product itself.
          The 3 year effort resulted in a new method (now known as the 'New Iso') which reduces the smoke delivery results by about 1 mg at the 16 mg level. The Marlboro sold in the EEC was initially delivering about 15.5 mg, prior to any analytical methodology change. When the new system was implemented, the deliveries were around 14.5 mg, but remember, no product change ever took place.

    • 00/04/29 Solvent residues in cigarettes RJR, Apr 27, 1984
        In addition to contaminants such as worms and insect larvae, "barn foam," (the polystyrene foam insulation used in tobacco drying barns) and insecticide and fungicide residues, the migration of solvents into cigarettes from their packaging is a problem. The solvents are used in the manufacture of the packaging. This R.J. Reynolds acknowledges that the presence of "retained solvents" in cigarettes from packaging creates "throat sting, harshness and an aftertaste." This makes it clear that such solvent residues are indeed being inhaled by consumers. No mention is made in this document, however, about the possible health effects that could occur from the repeated inhalation of (pyrolized) solvent residues that have migrated from their packaging into their cigarettes.
          Dr. John Woods and Mr. Bob Shore presented an overview of why retained solvents were a product detriment. They explained that when solvent odors are detected in labels and said labels are used to package cigarettes, throat sting, harshness and an aftertaste result. It was also noted that when smooth tasting MARLBORO cigarettes are used to replace WINSTONs in a package with known levels of retained solvents, the Marlboro also attains stingy, harsh character and an aftertaste.

    • 00/04/26 RJR on the 'youth market' RJR, Mar 8, 1973
        According to this document taken from the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (RJR) site, 14 year old smokers were not just a viable, but a very sought after market for RJR:
          Many manufacturers have 'studied' the 14-20 market in hopes of uncovering the 'secret' of the instant popularity some brands enjoy to the almost complete exclusion of others (as shown above). Creating a 'fad' in this market can be a great bonanza.

    • 00/04/26 Decline in growth of Marlboro RedPM, May 21, 1975
        The Philip Morris Tobacco Company says they don't market to children and teenagers. In fact, they now run frequent "kids don't smoke" television ads. That's quite a switch from their stance as revealed in this 1975 internal memorandum, wherein writer Myron Johnston of Philip Morris, discusses market penetration of Marlboro Red among 15-17 year olds. Johnston reveals his conclusion is based on "his own data," as stated in this passage:
          Most of these studies have been restricted to people age 18 and over, but my own data, which includes younger teenagers, shows even higher Marlboro market penetration among 15-17 year olds.

    • 00/04/24 Public favors smoking restrictions RJR, Oct 31, 1977
        The mid-1970's were somewhat of a "magic moment." The efforts of voluntary health organizations, the government and GASPS to educate people about the dangers of tobacco had kicked in, but the tobacco industry did not yet have a highly-financed and well-orchestrated response to these efforts. During this time, the Tobacco Institute (TI) commissioned the Roper organization to poll people to get a sense of the public's attitude towards smoking restrictions. The TI's poll revealed that people (including smokers) favored restrictions on public smoking--by a wide margin. The poll further revealed that the number of people favoring such restrictions was growing steadily.

    • 00/04/19 Fungicide Residue Exceeded Safe Limit BAT, May 4, 1990
        I have been told by a reliable source that ethylene thiourea (ETU) is a carcinogenic break down product of a fungicide used on oriental tobacco (ethylthiocarbamate). While the industry was aware that at least one European country (Germany) had a regulatory limit of 0.05 ppm of ETU for food products, this document reveals that several tobacco companies were aware that levels of this chemical far exceeded acceptable risk limits in their oriental tobaccos:
          RJR and PM estimate that smoke EBDC + ETU levels will far exceed above the risk level. Both companies claim measured average EBDC levels across their oriental of 12-15 ppm...

    • 00/04/18 PM fears decline in teen smokers PM, Mar 31, 1981
        In just a few short days Philip Morris will hold its annual stockholder meeting wherein the company's leaders are bound to re-emphasize how they don't want kids to smoke . . . This document reveals exactly the opposite: that Philip Morris closely monitored teen smoking prevalence and was desperate that the rate of teen smoking had dropped markedly by the early 1980s. In this document, a Philip Morris marketing analyst worriedly declares that according to trends, teen smoking would decrease even further by 1985, and describes this decrease as a demographic trend that was "turning against us.
          For over 15 years certain demographic and social trends have been moving in directions favorable to industry growth. Now, one by one, these powerful social and demographic factors are turning against us, and by 1985 all will be operating against us. The trends are: 1. After increasing for over a decade, the prevalence of teenage smoking is now declining sharply. 2. After increasing for over a decade, the average daily consumption of teenager smokers is declining. 3. After increasing 38 percent from 1967 to 1976, the absolute number of 15-19 year-olds will decline 19 percent during the 1980's

    • 00/04/17 RJR on pesticides in mainstream smoke RJR, Jun 21, 1972
        When people smoke cigarettes, in addition to the chemical additives, worm larvae, polystyrene foam ("barn foam") and other contaminants, they are also smoking pesticides. In this confidential document, the RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company quantifies the amount of chlorinated pesticides (including DDE and DDT) that get into mainstream cigarette smoke.
          The purpose of this study was to determine the chlorinated pesticide residue levels in mainstream smoke. SUMMARY: Pesticide residues in tobaccos and in the mainstream smoke from two filter king cigarettes and one regular cigarette were determined. It was found that the rate of transfer of pesticides from tobacco into smoke averaged about 12%.

    • 00/04/20 Contaminants in cigarettes BAT
        This document from the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company (B&W) site lists contaminants that contribute to "off-taste" in cigarettes. I haven't seen any documents, though, that discuss the health effects that may arise when customers breathe traces of, for example, pyrolized (burned) pesticides, fungicides, cleaning solvents, printing inks and polystyrene foam ("barn foam").
          Most common source of contamination is from solvent residues from printing inks, lacquers and glues. . . Microbial transformations of certain (chlorinated) phenolic materials gives rise to potent "musty" off-taste. . . Pallets/shipping containers/trucks/storage areas - external odor contamination - you name it -- it can happen. ...Barn foam (polystyrene) in flue-cured tobacco A problem for the last few years.

    • 00/04/13 Holey Smokes! RJR, 1998
        In addition to this letter, a search on the R.J. Reynolds site using the word "worms," returns an inter-office memo from 1983 that says worms in cigarettes were the #3 complaint among customers ("Worms and Bugs," Bates No. 506776793, 19830307).
          To Whom It May Concern, These cigarettes are full of worms. I just want to bring it to your attention and would like some kind of compensation. They were purchased at Jumbo Supermarket in Haileah, FL. I had purchased 10 packs at this time and there were others with worm holes. I hope this will help to stop this situation. I do like Winston

    • 00/04/12Nicotine tea bags? RJR, Apr, 1991
        This document was interesting for its exploitation of people's love for rituals, and its discussion of how to tobacco companies can exploit the human need for rituals to promote cigarettes and smoking. It is interesting to consider, after reading this portion of the document, just how many of our everyday actions may be the result of some corporate microscope on human behavior in the name of marketing, and how marketing has shaped our every day world.

        The first cake mixes contained all the necessary ingredients except milk - and they failed. They failed, market research later showed, not because they didn't work, but because they eliminated all of the loving ritual of baking a cake. The mixes were just too instant. . . Cigarette smoking is filled with ritual. The problem is that the ritual is the same regardless of the brand.... A crazy idea for an improved cigarette and a fun ritual to go with it ...Imagine a tobacco-based coffee-like drink. The product would have the following requirements and advantages: Fulfills the physical pleasures of tobacco. Namely taste, smell and nicotine. Allows satisfying rituals associated with coffee drinking to accompany consumption of tobacco.

    • 00/04/12 Price impact on 12-17 year olds RJR, OCT 6, 1982
        A portion of this R.J. Reynolds document examines the effect that the Fairness Doctrine had on cigarette sales among youth ages 12-17. The Fairness Doctrine was a law that required television stations to give equal time to opposing viewpoints. John Banzhaf of ASH was the first to insist that this measure be applied to cigarette ads in the 1960s. His efforts resulted in the first anti-smoking ads on American TV. In the words of this document, "[T]he Fairness Doctrine...loaded television with anti-smoking commercials from 7/67 through 12/70." These counter ads WERE NOT produced by the tobacco industry. The document notes that these ads had an "important negative effect during [the Fairness Doctrine's] first year (accounting for a 3 percentage point drop in 12-17 incidence)."

    • 00/04/08 SAFE Cigarette Project BAT, Oct 29, 1986
        In this correspondence a British American Tobacco Company executive explains why he doesn't believe the tobacco industry should research and manufacture a "safer cigarette":
          The BAT objective is and should be to make the whole subject of smoking acceptable to the authorities and to the public at large since this is the real challenge facing the Industry. . . ..in attempting to develop a "safe" cigarette you are, by implication, in danger of being interpreted as accepting that the current product is 'unsafe' and this is not a position that I think we should take...

    • 00/04/06 BAT on getting kids to smoke BAT, Dec 15, 1977
        By 1977, British American Tobacco (BAT) had produced this official (restricted) internal report saying that most smokers start during adolescence and that very few people start to smoke once past the age of 20. Furthermore, this report tells us that the more people a child sees smoking around him ("models" and "definers"), the more likely s/he is to become a regular smoker. Following, too, is an interesting observation from this report:
          ..of those teenagers smoking more than one cigarette only 15% avoid becoming regular dependent smokers.

    • 00/04/05 TI Decides What Goes on Death Certificates TI, Sep 1989
        Objective: To represent and protect the tobacco industry's legitimate common interests in other significant and emerging issues. Strategies 1. Tobacco Use on Death Certificates a. Defeat all state legislative or regulatory proposals to include specific reference to smoking or tobacco use on death certificate forms. b. Repeal of modify existing state regulations which have placed references to smoking or tobacco use on death certificate forms. c. Monitor federal agency activity that could lead to inclusion of tobacco use questions on model death certificates. d. Seek opportunities through federal action to preempt placement of such references on state forms.

    • 00/04/03RJR, Sep 12, 1962: 1962 Analysis of the Smoking and Health Problem
        this is an old, but interesting document. First, it exposes the fact that prior to 1962 the Tobacco Industry Research Council (TIRC) produced studies clearly demonstrating tobacco's harms (studies that isolated carcinogenic compounds in cigarette smoke, demonstrated paralysis of cilia due to smoke components, produced tumors with cigarette smoke, and more.) Second, the writer (who was then the head of R.J. Reynolds Chemical Research Department) seems to be arguing that the industry should become more informed internally about its own products, in case the government tries to regulate them. He also points out that the industry was treading on thin ice (even way back then, in 1962), by bringing up the poignant question:
          Members of this Research Department have studied in detail cigarette smoke composition...Some of the findings have been published. However, much data remain unpublished because they are concerned with carcinogenic or cocarcinogenic compounds... This raises an interesting question about the former compounds. If a tobacco company plead "Not guilty" or "Not proven" to the charge that cigarette smoke (or one of its constituents) is an etiological factor in the causation of lung cancer or some other disease, can the company justifiably assume the position that publication of data pertaining to cigarette smoke composition or physiological properties should be withheld because such data might affect adversely the company's economic status when the company has already implied in its plea that no such etiologic effect exists?

    • 00/04/03 RJR on "pre-smokers" RJR, Feb 2, 1973
        This R.J. Reynolds document is a chilling example of how tobacco companies research the social tendencies and psychological needs of young people in order to exploit them. . . Most of all, though, this document shows that the tobacco industry has a deep understanding of what makes kids want to smoke, and how to exploit this
          The beginning smoker and inhaler has a low tolerance for smoke irritation, hence the smoke should be as bland as possible.... if the desire to be daring is part of the motivation to start smoking, the alleged risk of smoking may actually make smoking attractive. Finally, if the 'older' establishment is preaching against smoking, the anti-establishment sentiment ... would cause the young to want to be defiant and smoke. Thus, a new brand aimed at the young group should not in any way be promoted as a "health" brand, and perhaps should carry some implied risk. In this sense, the warning label on the package may be a plus.

    • 00/04/02 Associations between smoking and depression PM, Feb 21, 1996
        The following document reveals that Philip Morris is aware internally of literature revealing a substantial link between smoking and depression. Supportive of this is the fact that the new cessation drug, Zyban, is actually the same as Wellbutrin, an anti-depressant.

    • 00/04/01 Tobacco's competition: pot, drugs, tranquilizers RJR, Feb 13, 1980
        Changing social values may add to manufacturing costs and reduce the market for cigarettes: --Social acceptance of smoking will continue to decline. --Methods may evolve for relatively painless methods for stopping smoking. --Competitive products, such as alcohol, pot, tranquilizers and the new generation of psychotropic drugs may decrease the market for cigarettes.

    • 00/03/31 Health warnings in Thailand PM Asia, Sep 30, 1990
        Warnings on Thai cigarette packages (7 rotating warnings, must be on the front of the pack.): 1. Smoking is hazardous to health. 2. Smoking causes lung cancer and pulmonary diseases. 3. Smoking causes cardiovascular diseases. 4. Smoking is harmful to fetus. 5. Respect the rights of others by not smoking in public. 6. Quit smoking reduces the risks of dangerous diseases. 7. Quit smoking for the sake of your loved ones.

    • 00/03/29 The tobacco industry & tort reform PM, 1995
        According to this document, the tobacco industry is deeply involved with tort reform efforts both at the state and federal levels.
          Our objective here is to assure that the legal system recognizes both the rights and the responsibilities of adults who have made informed choices.... .In addition to our aggressive defense of the lawsuits, we are taking aggressive, proactive action in the area of Tort Reform. . . On March 10, after a major grassroots campaign, the House passed the "Common Sense Product Liability and Legal Reform Act." . . As the debate continues, we will continue to participate vigorously in a massive grassroots' communications effort

    • 00/03/27 'Iron fist in a velvet glove' RJR, Dec 22, 1978
        This is one of the 39,000 internal documents that the tobacco industry was forced to turn over to the Senate Commerce Committee after losing a bid to the U.S. Supreme Court to withhold them from the public. It contains on of my personal all-time favorite industry quotes:
          Unless countervailing steps are taken (such as lobbying) public decision-making will march with public opinion....
        ...in addition to some other remarkable revelations, like how difficult it would be to rally smokers behind their "rights" when most of them really want to quit smoking. It is also remarkable for the haughty attitude revealed by the following line:
          The industry's lobbying and campaign effects should not be ballyhooed. Our aim is a clean iron fist inside a clean velvet glove...

    • 00/03/26 Dioxin in ETS PM, May 3, 1994
        These Philip Morris Tobacco Company documents reveal that dioxins are present in secondhand tobacco smoke. Dioxins are a product of combustion. . . To my knowledge, no warning of the presence of dioxins in cigarette smoke (either primary or secondhand smoke) has ever been given to consumers of the product nor to bystanders exposed to secondhand smoke, nor otherwise been made public information.
          The proposed project is intended to determine the parameters which influence the concentrations of polychlorinated dioxins and furans (PCDD/PCDF). The objective is to further decrease the already very low concentrations of dioxins in ETS. In order to simplify the process, the amount of dioxins in sidestream smoke is used as a measure for the amount originating from the cigarette. Eventually, it makes sense to investigate only those parameters which have a clear impact on dioxin release; in the early phase of the project however, all parameters must be considered which could possibly have an effect on the formation of dioxins and furans.

    • 00/03/25 1990 Proactive Legislative Plans TI, Oct 2, 1989
        This document shows that in the United States, the tobacco industry develops and implements its own legislation in the states. In the U.S., we used to have a democracy in which citizens could enact their own laws at the local level on any topic, but since so many people wanted clean indoor air laws, bans on free nicotine samples (and other laws that Big Tobacco disliked), the tobacco industry enacted their own laws to take away peoples' rights. They have been very successful. By 1994, the industry had successfully enacted its laws to remove citizens' rights ("preemption laws") in 25 states.
          While our primary goal is the enactment of positive industry legislation, another important objective is to set the tobacco agenda in the state legislatures... We have targeted 35 states for [proactive] legislative action, with one or more of the following objectives in each state: --Preemption of local smoking restrictions --Rollback or modification of existing smoking restrictions... --...Adoption of indoor air quality and ventilation standards --Preemption of local tobacco tax authority --Preemption of local sampling bans...

    • 00/03/24 Smoking & Health Research Activities in Europe PM, 1990
        This "privileged and confidential attorney-work-product" from the Philip Morris (PM) document site reveals the real purpose of PM's European biological research labs: to create data that contradicts the science on environmental tobacco smoke (ETS)
          Science and Technology is staffed by 9 academics....Their mission is centered on environmental tobacco smoke and commissioning researchers and potential authors of scientific papers to produce data, publications or statements that contradict or correct the scientific misinformation about ETS. . . The S&T [Science and Technlogy] group directly commissions contract work on ETS. These projects are designed to provide data to support the industry's responses to damaging studies in ETS.

    • 00/03/23 Passive smoking is harmfulPM, 9/9/88
        shows that Philip Morris attorneys were aware of a substantial amount of literature in existence by 1988 which concluded that passive smoking is harmful to the health of infants and children and increases the risk of cancer in nonsmokers who live with smokers.
          Tentative conclusions of a positive nature which have emerged to date appear to be the following: 1. Children who have a mother who is a heavy smoker have a higher than average incidence of respiratory infections, the frequency more or less proportional to the amount of smoking. 2. The newborn children of women who smoke have lower birth weight on average than newborns of non-smoking mothers.

    • 00/03/22Stop the war on disease TI, Jan 10, 1979
        This 165-page confidential Tobacco Institute report, Smoking and Health 1964-1979: The Continuing Controversy, is a denial-fest that refutes the causation of virtually every disease that we now accept as smoking induced.
          The American people would be better served if high government health officials and private interest groups which encourage them abandoned the myth of "waging war" against diseases and their alleged causes.

    • 00/03/21 Cigarettes, Fires and Fire Departments TI, 1990
        According to this document, Tobacco Institute, Public Affairs Division Proposed Budget 1991 the tobacco industry has been extraordinarily generous financially to fire fighting organizations, giving grants to hundreds of fire departments in major cities across the U.S. for "fire safety education programs" and provides them with "fire safety education materials." Their tactic effectively quelled criticism of the safety risks of cigarette design by fire service organizations across the country. This document reveals that the industry clearly recognizes the scope of the problem. Yet the document contains absolutely no mention of concern for the victims of cigarette-caused fires nor for the safety of the firefighters who must respond to these fires.

    • 00/03/16 BATS's Smoking and Health Issues handbook BAT, Feb 26, 1981
        the British American Tobacco Company (BAT) attempted to prepare a guidebook for employees to help them handle questions about smoking and health issues. The comments from this editor on a draft of the handbook are remarkable. Note that even in the eighth draft of this booklet, the emphasis is on eliminating incriminating contradictions, avoiding liability, minimizing the contributions that doctors have in the debate and keeping from inflaming the passive smoking debate.
          I am very surprised to find BAT mentioning that there indeed exist some people who are allergic to tobacco smoke. My impression was that no allergy to tobacco smoke had ever been identified...I would suggest that they crosscheck this information very closely as allergy is one of the many arguments that anti-smokers use in the passive smoking debate. . . I am amazed that BAT would agree with the advice of doctors concerning pregnant women....BAT's argument could open the door to claims for warnings on cigarette packages, for example, and has very important implications in the passive smoking debate

    • 00/03/21 ICOSI and the 1979 World Conference PM, Sep, 1978
        The international tobacco companies came together to form a committee to deal with the onslaught of smoking and health issues worldwide in a unified manner. It was called the International Committee on Smoking Issues (ICOSI). In 1979, ICOSI was trying to figure out how to deal with the Fourth World Conference on Tobacco or Health . . . This urgent telex talks about the strategic problems ICOSI faced in dealing with the health information which could be revealed at the conference. The document notes that for the first time (1979) the tobacco industry adjusted the venue of its battle, and aimed it for the first time directly at the general public, in particular worldwide anti-smoking advocates. . . rather than accept public health policies created by governments, the tobacco companies planned to determine their own "appropriate" public policies, and then use their affiliates to implement them.
          ICOSI [International Committee on Smoking Issues] is the first initiative on a worldwide scale to counter the actions of the anti-smoking groups, which -- with the WHO and other internationally active bodies -- are already organized on a worldwide basis... Total ICOSI membership controls an over-whelmingly large share of the market in the free world and ICOSI could therefore be circumspect in the eyes of anti-trust enforcing bodies in several countries.

    • 00/03/14 Powers of Boards of Health TI, Oct 9, 1986
        In recent years, the industry has been trying to pass measures at the state level to preempt this power, so that local boards of health will be rendered powerless to enact such restrictions. The following memo from the Tobacco Institute site shows the industry's alarm over the powers of local boards of health to enact smoking restrictions.
          Please evaluate the nature of the powers of the Public Health Council, Board of Health or similar administrative body in your state and advise me accordingly. This, of course, is to identify any state that may have non-legislative opportunities for obtaining smoking restriction laws.

    • 00/03/13 Public smoking Programs of the TI TI, Apr 24, 1990
        With a great sense of purpose and virtually unlimited budget, the TI left no stone unturned its work to alter public opinion. According to this document, the TI recruited academics "to influence the scientific community's view of ETS science," imported foreign scientists to convince health reporters and editorial boards that "the U.S. response to ETS science is extreme and out of step with the rest of the world...," "chastised" journalists for their reporting on scientific issues and hosted journalism seminars to show reporters the "right" way to report on these issues, and more.

    • 00/03/12 More on CIAR Covington & Burling, Mar 12, 1993
        The tobacco industry successfully dodged the health issue regarding environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) by "developing data" to convince policy makers, opinion leaders, and the world media that environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) was an insignificant component of a much larger problem: indoor air pollution and poor overall ventilation. These handwritten confidential notes from the Tobacco Institute document site sum up the industry's strategy to deal with ETS .
          In sum, while one might wish it otherwise, the value of CIAR depends upon the industry's playing an active role in (1) identifying research projects likely to be of value and (2) working to make sure that the findings of funded research are brought to the attention of decision makers in an appropriate and timely manner. CIAR is a credible and effective vehicle for conducting research that is needed to buttress the industry's position...

    • 00/03/12 The Center for Indoor Air Research (CIAR) TI, Dec 10, 1987
        several cigarette companies colluded to form a scientific front group called the Center for Indoor Air Research or CIAR. Much of the work to form CIAR was conducted through Philip Morris' law firm, Covington and Burling, which allowed documents to be labeled "Attorney Work Product." CIAR had to operate "at arm's length" from the industry so the Tobacco Institute incorporated it as a completely separate, non-profit entity. The purpose of CIAR was to give grants to scientists who would in turn do research, produce and publish studies that would bolster the industry's arguments against regulation of environmental tobacco smoke. Another goal was the eventual creation of its own scientific journal, the contents of which could be controlled completely by the tobacco industry.

    • 00/03/11 Attack on Allstate/Sears TI, Sep 20, 1979
        In 1979, Allstate Insurance/Sears introduced its "Healthy American Plan," a life insurance plan that included non-smoker discounts. . . The tobacco industry . . . started encouraging businesses to boycott Allstate/Sears. . . Allstate's Senior VP Robert Seilor wrote the following letter to the Tobacco Institute.
          Your objectives and tactics will be considered by most people, including many in government, as completely contradictory to the Tobacco Institute's advertisements. . . "Freedom of choice is the best choice." How will non-smokers be apprised of the existence of a discount on life insurance if you seek to "penalize" Allstate or Sears for advertising the existence of the discount? ....The publicity which your efforts are generating (judging by the number of interviews I have granted in the last week) is certain to come to the attention of the national cancer and heart associations as well as the HEW and "anti-smokers" organizations. They will probably use this activity against you in an effort to destroy your factual credibility, since your actions are so contradictory to the Tobacco Institute's own ad.

    • 00/03/08 VA hospital "stupidity" TI, Sep 12, 1973
        In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the information about the ill health effects of smoking prompted the Veterans Administration to eliminate sales of cigarette sales from VA hospitals. Letters to the editor appeared in newspapers across the country charging that "inhuman bureaucrats" were engaging in "sadistic treatment" of lonely veterans who have no other pleasures in life other than their cigarettes. The following handwritten note from one Tobacco Institute executive to another was clipped to a 1973 newspaper article entitled "Veteran's Hospital in Chicago bans sale of cigarets."
          In view of Rep. Gross' interest as expressed in the 7482 debate Monday, he might like to take on the VA cig sales ban movement. Would like to see someone keep the heat on to point up the stupidity of making it more difficult for hospitalized veterans to obtain cigarettes if they choose to smoke.

    • 00/03/07 Attack on Mass. Bay Transportation Authority TI, Jun 19, 1986
        The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) found itself the target of tobacco industry attack after its board voted to stop accepting cigarette ads on its vehicles and facilites in 1986. . . The TI incited ad agencies that had lost out on MBTA's advertising contracts in the past to sue MBTA for discrimination in its award processes. They tried to insert a clause in the state budget to force MBTA "to maximize ad revenues from all legal sources" (including tobacco) . . . They tried to get the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the labor unions to galvanize against MBTA. . . They tried to incite discontent in cities along MBTA's routes. . . they planned to influence their political allies in the federal government to cut MBTA's funding.

    • 00/03/06 TI target: the insurance industryTI, Nov 22, 1989
        This memo reveals a far-reaching plot by Big Tobacco against the insurance industry to eliminate non-smoker discounts, complete with the formation of (yet another) front group. This time it's a "consumer rights" group, headed by a "key 'consumer rights' nemesis of the insurance industry,' who, according to the memo "demands no less than $5,000 a month" for his services to the tobacco industry. The purpose of this fake "consumer group" was to focus broadly on "discriminatory practices of the insurance industry" and had the goal of eliminating non-smoker discounts.

    • 00/03/05 TI aggression against other businesses RJR-MacDonald, Apr 18, 1986
        The tobacco industry used its economic muscle to intimidate and punish other businesses when they enacted smoke-free policies. Airlines took the brunt of the tobacco industry's wrath when they started providing the public with safe, smoke-free cabin air on some flights. This is the letter that the President of RJR-Macdonald Tobacco Company (Canada) wrote to the President of Air Canada after that airline designated some of its flights between Toronto and Montreal and Toronto and Ottawa as totally non-smoking, on a trial basis in 1986.

    • 00/03/02 Philip Morris aggression PM, May 7, 1984:
        When Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals started marketing Nicorette gum in the early 1980s, it put out a newsletter in doctors' clinics called the Smoking Cessation Newsletter. . . To punish Dow for the unforgivable transgression of encouraging people to quit smoking cigarettes, PM ceased all of its humectant purchases from Dow, and let them know why. PM had to start buying their humectants overseas, but it was worth it to them to stick it to Dow. This document shows that behind the scenes, Philip Morris is quite a bit more ruthless their current TV ads would like to reveal.

    • 00/03/01 Hysterical airline message Lorillard, Jun 27, 1977
        First, notice how the near-hysterical tone seems so out of proportion to the "problem" at hand. After all, the airline wasn't even banning smoking... it was merely providing a separate smoking section on its planes. The tone of the message reveals the depth of the industry's fear and anger about clean air efforts in general. Secondly, it is not remarkable that mankind held a drug-taking behavior in such high esteem?
          "Eastern Airlines has entered an unconscionable agreement with Prohibitionist "consumer groups" to squeeze travelers who enjoy tobacco into the rear third of its flight cabins. The agreement was reached was privately in spite of its implications of potential second-class citizenship for 55 million Americans! . . Think of its implications, its potential for precedent in successful attacks on the personal freedoms of other groups of citizens--on yourself as an individual. . . Use the addresses on the back of this message. And thanks for your citizenship!"

    • 2/29/00 Bill Bradley's ad for the TI, 1967 TI, Dec 1, 1967
        HEADLINE: YOUNGSTERS SHOULDN'T SMOKE SAYS BILL BRADLEY...and the cigarette makers agree! . . I'm asking you young people not to touch a cigarette until you have the age and experience to evaluate this published information. Adults can and do understand this material. They have the mature judgment that comes with age. . . TAG: The cigarette makers publish Bill Bradley's statement in the interest of American Youth.

    • 2/28/00 Arguing against cautionary labels BAT, Jan 15, 1969
        This is a letter from an employee of the British American Tobacco's Research Planning Department helping a tobacco company executive in Sydney, Australia formulate an argument against his government's proposal to mandate warning labels on cigarettes.
          "A vague statement such as "Cigarette Smoking may be harmful to health" is a lot easier to live with then something more specific . . . Whether a constantly reiterated caution of this type has any effect on smoker is, I suggest, outside the argument. Personally, I doubt the value of it.

    • 2/27/00 How to catch a FUBYA RJR, 1984
        This document helps us understand why the tobacco companies insist on sponsoring music festivals . . . to understand the psychological reasons for having a "Marlboro Adverture Team" (it's "on the edge"--appeals to FUBYAs' risk-taking behavior.)
          FUBYAS are insecure abut their decision making ability. Choose leading big brands w/broad acceptance. Marlboro not purchased because it's a big brand but because it has the peer approval. . . . FUBYAS Love of Fads and Fun . . . Fads are so much a part of FUBYAS lives because fads serve their needs for group belonging and identification, for excitement and fun. . . Since the late 40's- early 50's, when FUBYAS and their peers became a legitimate, important sub-segment of our society, MUSIC has been their most important badge of identity

    • 2/26/00 TI strategies across the nation TI, Apr 7, 1988
        Senior TI VP Mozingo brags about the astonishing number of clean indoor measures that Tobacco Institute defeated in states, cities and counties all across the nation-- in just one year alone.

    • 2/25/00 Furs and Station Wagons PM, Jan 25, 1985
        Marketing departments often classify people into social sub-groups, which they name for quick and easy identification. This document tells us what Philip Morris calls sub-categories of wealthy people, or, as they call them, the "Upscale Smoker Clusters."

    • 2/21/00 Operation Down Under (II) PM, Jun 24, 1987
        Operation Down Under was perhaps the first major internal Philip Morris' (PM) effort to define a comprehensive strategy to combat information being revealed to the public that environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) is harmful to non-smokers. These extensive and concise notes were taken over the three days of the conference. This document provides a very frank inside look at the aggressive tactics the industry uses to stave off public health measures on secondhand smoke.

    • 2/20/00 It's called methane, pal PM, Nov 30, 1989
        The industry embarked on finding other odiferous elements in indoor air, so they could point the finger at those.
          "INBIFO - Body Odour and Staleness of Air - Objective: To relate staleness of indoor air to human gaseous metabolic products other than carbon dioxide. Status: A list of odoriferous compounds, emitted by humans and not obviously present in tobacco smoke, has been prepared from a literature search.

    • 2/20/00 Tobacco and death certificates TI, Nov 19, 1969
        This article from the Nov. 19, 1969 Grand Rapids (Michigan) Press, describes a case where the Liggett and Myers Tobacco Company (L&M) tried to block the use of a death certificate as a foundation for medical testimony linking smoking to a fatal lung cancer in a father of four.

    • 2/19/00 Burned theobromine: no hot fudge sundae! PM, Oct 14, 1979
        In late 1977 a new, no-tobacco smoking product was put on the market called FREE. . . . Philip Morris (PM) examined FREE in their labs to see how it compared to regular tobacco cigarettes, particularly their brand, MARLBORO. . . Still, PM concluded that there was much more to FREE chemically than federal regulatory agencies were aware, and that because of this, these agencies were "somewhat misguided" in not requiring a health warning for FREE cigarettes.

    • 2/17/00 Notes on a World ETS meeting PM, April, 1994
        Notes on a meeting that was held in 1994 . . . they convey valuable information briefly and concisely, ie, that quit rates jump from 5% to 21% in workplaces that are non-smoking. Ellen Merlo's relating of industry strategy regarding secondhand smoke: "Shift argument to indoor air quality and accommodation as an effective approach."

    • 2/16/00 Those poor U.K. smokers... PM, May 21, 1984
        Mr. Whist is mulling over a proposal for a new campaign to ask smokers to be courteous towards others while smoking. . . Note Mr. Whist's level of condescension toward working-class people, their smokers, whose lives, he believes would be dark places without the simple pleasures of pubs, TV and cigarettes.

    • 2/15/00 Designer front group - TASSC PM, March 24, 1994
        After the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) declared secondhand smoke as a Class A Human Carcinogen . . . up sprang another PM front group, this time called "The Advancement of Sound Science Coalition," or TASSCM created TASSC through a public relations firm called APCO Associates, a move which helped PM distance itself from the group.

    • 2/15/00 "S" is for "Substance" (ARISE) PM, February 17, 1994
        ARISE was the acronym for one of Philip Morris' many "designer front groups," Associates for Research in the Science of Enjoyment. This group was established as a public relations move, to minimize the perception of danger posed by tobacco products by linking their use in the public's eye with other fun and enjoyable substances and activities that are relatively harmless (e.g. shopping, drinking tea, sex). The acronym at first stood for "Associates for Research in Substance Enjoyment."

    • 2/12/00 ARISE: Associates for Research into the Science of Enjoyment PM, 1994
        PM used ARISE to minimize the 1988 U.S. Surgeon General's finding that nicotine is as addictive as heroin. ARISE "scientists" studied the "science of pleasure," finding, amazingly enough, that imbibing in coffee, tea, chocolate, sex and--yes--tobacco causes pleasure. Topics at the conferences were carefully chosen to "align tobacco with food and drink," and staunchly oppose "forcing a uniform healthy society." . . the proposed 1994-95 budget for ARISE was $773,750.

    • 2/9/00 Uptown Damage Assessment S\udy RJR, Jan. 31, 1990
        The document goes on to say they can learn from this marketing gaffe and find away around the glitch they ran into with "Uptown" --and provides a road map with which to do it.

    • 2/8/00 Moral Issue on FTC Tar RJR, Nov. 9, 1984
        In this document, a tobacco a company executive rationalizes to others inside the company, assuring them of the moral correctness of failing to disclose to public health agencies that FTC tests reveal incorrect tar levels for their products. . . Finally, the last few lines of this document should reinforce to us how effective banning smoking in public places could be. . . "So little cost could reap such a tremendous improvement in public health!" Hey, even the tobacco industry points out how effective such environmental measures are in improving public health.

    • 2/7/00 FUBYAS, Coolness and Blacks RJR, Nov. 9, 1984
        This document links the decline in sales of RJR's SALEM brand (their "coolness" cigarette) in part to the brand's "strong, negative association with Blacks." This in turn leads to speculation that the problems with sales may have started with school integration. From this we can see how very sociological the tobacco industry is.

    • 2/6/00Studying 11-Year-Olds' Brain Waves BAT, July 28, 1982
        This British-American Tobacco Company (BAT) scientist's trip report describes the intent to study the brainwaves of 11-year-old children before they are smokers, and then five years later after some of them become smokers. The idea was to see if smoking altered their brain waves. The document also discusses the ethical problems of testing children, and shows their intent to insulate the industry from these questions by contracting the study out to a university or hospital, who would then assume the burden of the ethical questions for them.

    • 2/6/00 "Our preemption strategy" PM, Oct 24, 1984
        This speech describes Philip Morris' strategy and political activities in the New England states. In it, Merlo directly links Philip Morris' "Accommodation Program" to its enacting of pre-emption laws at the state level, even running the words together into a single term, "Accommodation/Pre-emption." . . She also tells us that Philip Morris is not above pressing their own sales force, employees and even external employees at Kraft and Miller Beer, into taking political action on their behalf, and she makes clear that they also use the grocers associations and restaurant associations to do their bidding.

    • 2/5/00 Employee Morale at Philip Morris PM, Oct 24, 1994
        Stories in the media that expose the truth about tobacco company behavior affect the morale of employees at those tobacco companies. Apparently this is what happened during the Cippolone trial, when the media started exposing Philip Morris' internal documents to the public. Employee morale suffered and that gave rise to this "buck up" memo idea from PM's public relations company, Burson Marsteller. (Apparently tobacco companies' PR firms to do "internal PR" as well as "external PR.

    • 2/3/00 RJR legislative counsel briefing book RJR, April 1, 1989
        This is a laundry list of tobacco industry control efforts in the Amerian judicial system, legislatures, political campaigns, on death certificates and more

    • 2/2/00"Operation Berkshire": world TI collusion PM, June 8, 1977
    • 2/1/00Worldwide defensive health strategy PM, Dec 3, 1976
    • 2/1/00More info on BAT's bio conferences BAT, 1984


    • 1/31/00Cadmium in tobacco smoke BAT, Oct 10, 1972
    • 1/10/00 The Marlboro Man is Gay PM, Feb, 1994
        This document shows the intense scrutiny Philip Morris Tobacco Company gives the gay community in order to market appealing cigarette imagery to this group. . . Here, a market research company is conducting focus groups among gay men for Philip Morris, to hone in on the appropriate imagery needed to sell cigarettes to gay men.

    • 1/3/00The Tobacco Institute TI, Sep 27, 1971
    • 1/2/00Credibility PM, 1991
    • 1/1/00PM in Europe and the Mid- East PM, Nov. 15, 1987

    • 12/31/99Function of Smoking in Everyday Life BAT, April 24, 1984
    • 12/29/99Ranking kids, or "FUBYAS" RJR, 1984
    • 9/3/99 Yesterday seat belts, tomorrow strait jackets PM, Aug 8, 1988
        Today's document is a print ad that was apparently published by the Tobacco Advisory Council in response to a ban on smoking on British flights in 1988: "BRITISH AIRWAYS GROUNDS ALL SMOKERS . . . Will All Smokers Kindly Extinguish Their Personal Freedom.

    • 9/2/99 Public Smoking Hearing Readiness PM, Feb, 1989
        lists the arguments that the tobacco industry "must cover" in hearings for public smoking bills. Note the arguments that smoking bans discriminate against women, the disabled and blue collar workers while favoring white male executives, and the argument that smoking bans on airplanes will cause a fire hazard.

    • 9/1/99 Dioxin, DDT and "other scares" PM, Mar 2, 1993
        This document is a list and discussion of possible individuals they could approach to write favorable op-ed pieces on the subject of environmental tobacco smoke

    • 8/30/99"Free Basing" NicotineRJR, Oct 2, 1973
        This R.J. Reynolds SECRET document reveals RJR's discovery that their competitors PhilipMorris' and Lorillard were using a chemical technique to "free base" nicotine in the smoke of Marlboro and KOOL cigarettes by manipulating the smoke pH. This chemical manipulation increased sales of those brands.

    • 8/30/99 Levulinic Acid & Enhanced Nicotine Binding Capacity RJR, 1987, 1989
        An RJ Reynolds scientific report from 1989 describes how RJR's additives nicotine levulinate and levulinic acid enhance the binding capacity of nicotine in the brain by 20-50%. Other documents show RJR added these chemicals to Winston ultra lights

    • 8/29/99 The Ethics of Billie Jean King PM, 1984-94
        In 1984 Billie Jean King received $75,000 for promoting Virginia Slims. The contract required that she "take an active role int he promotion of the Ginny Circuit and the younger players in the game," and host "two player seminars during the year at tournaments with the object being to educate the younger players on the importance of effective public relations, interview techniques and other aspects of being a touring tennis professional" and "To use her best efforts to promote her involvement with Virginia Slims when she is participating in other activities not on behalf of Virginia Slims.

    • 8/27/99 Trend Influence Marketing RJR, Apr 14, 1994
        Today's document reveals a new marketing approach by RJ Reynolds called Trend Influence Marketing (TIM). TIM abandoned standard advertising campaigns and instead jumped directly into the arena of trying to "become the trend-maker." . . In order to acquire an open ear and to gain the respect of these trend setters, we will speak their language, dress their dress, and walk their walk.... We will project the proper image and approach to influence them. Using our nightclub experience combined with our marketing savvy and our numerous nationwide 'trendy' contacts, we can reach this group with confidence.

    • 8/26/99A Smoker's Alliance PM, Jul 9, 1993
        a Philip Morris presentation, A Smoker's Alliance, which explained the initial need for, and concept of a National Smoker's Alliance (NSA) to fight clean indoor air laws.

    • 8/20/99 Pilferage in Perspective RJR, Sep 12,1985
        This RJR document, Pilferage in Perspective, is a presentation whose purpose is to talk retailers out of the "knee jerk reaction" of moving their cigarettes out of reach of customers in response to pilferage. The document shows how retailers can, in most cases, make more profit if they allow their cigarettes to be stolen (due to the industry-paid "placement" or "slotting fees"). The document contains equations that demonstrate how slotting fees more than offset retailers' loss from theft.

    • 8/19/99 Nicotine levels vs. sales PM, May 14, 1975
        Today's document shows the interest Philip Morris takes in the relationship between nicotine content of Marlboro cigarettes and sales. Instead of a quote, I am attaching a chart taken from the document that is an excellent visual.

    • 99/01/05 Some women like it PM, Jan 3, 1971
        Partial transcript of a CBS "Face the Nation" show broadcast Sunday, January 3, 1971. The program featured an interview with Joseph Cullman, then Chairman of the Board of Philip Morris, Inc. The interviewers asked Cullman if he was aware of a massive study [which] showed that babies of smoking mothers were had a greater incidence of low birth weight than non-smoking mothers, that smoking mothers had an increased risk of stillbirth and infant death within 28 days of birth. Cullman said he was aware of the study and its results. His response . . . Some women would prefer having smaller babies. . . Many of the questions asked of Cullman in this interview are still pertinent today, such as why Philip Morris continues to market promote smoking among women through the Virginia Slims tennis tournament, all the while knowing that smoking can hurt fetuses of pregnant women.

    • Clean Indoor Air laws reduce sales
    • RJR's Secret Project Spa
    • Social-Political Context of Cig Sales in th
    • Teen Smoking and the Federal Excise Tax
    • Third parties needed
    • "Like any drug addict"
    • Nicotine Augmentation Project (NAP)
    • B&W's FACT and "gas/health strategy"
    • Graph: Cig Sales vs. nicotine
    • Drug-taking is normal, nicotine use noble
    • TI's "holding strategy"
    • Global ETS Conspiracy-It's real
    • Rush for the White Coats
    • It's not free choice if you're addicted
    • share of the 14-17 age group
    • Sampling Young Adult Smokers
    • Defensive Health Strategy
    • Corporatocracy
    • Foster doubt & stop Pro Kids legislation
    • The Stonewall Approach to ETS
    • Op-Eds and LTEs
    • "Excellent Report, could be damaging to bus
    • BAT "Assumptions"
    • imply due diligence
    • Undermining EPA/OSHA
    • A responsible company
    • Fumoaphobia syndrome
    • Super Lark - It's less carcinogenic
    • PM: How many times must we say "NO"?
    • vital statistics
    • Behavioral & Psychopharmacological Factors
    • Pilferage in Perspective
    • "Reach for the vomit bowl"
    • Expanded Local Programs
    • Other quotes to use
    • Preemption (AKA "Accommodation")
    • The NRA strategy: Make it hurt
    • "He knows where his bread is buttered"
    • Chemical Puppetry
    • The Anti-tobacco industry's "health scare"
    • Project Coumarin - Top Secret
    • Less Educated-Today's Trend, Tomorrow's Mark
    • Look credible, avoid suspicion
    • PR Activities, 1958
    • Every possible roadblock
    • Misinformercial
    • Smoking-Anti-Smoking Education
    • Cold Turkey]
    • The Doctor's advice
    • Additives - cocoa
    • Lung disease causes smoking
    • Beneficial additives
    • Stallone Sells Out
    • Other ways to reach the target
    • BAT's Nicotine Review
    • Counter-ASSIST Plan
    • Youth Market share data
    • Dependence on Cigarette Smoking (BAT report)
    • The Toxocity of Nicotine (BAT)
    • "Independent" scientist group in the UK
    • Saying "no" to safer cigarettes
    • "Kids," nicotine and amphetamine
    • ICOSI
    • Wanted: Smoking Issues Manager
    • The Patch
    • Smoking, Sex and self-administration
    • No credibility? Use 3rd parties
    • Workplace bans help smokers quit
    • Project Brass
    • Social Acceptability of Smoking
    • Perhaps nicotine is the least guilty (BAT)
    • Cig Market History, Interpretation
    • Cigs=cancer (RJR 1953)
    • INFOTAB
    • Preemption: Government by Corporation
    • Smoking and Health Volume I
    • Social costs of smoking
    • B&W on TI's "New Directions"
    • Action plan for ETS in Europe '89-'92
    • Philip Morris on the effects of chew
    • undermining health in Spain
    • quitting poses a risk to the industry
    • fewer in the psych wards, fewer Valium Rx's
    • Southampton Biological conference '84
    • Pathological Effects of cigarette smoke (BA
    • RJR legislative counsel briefing book
      NOTE: You can find Scott Goold's nice HTML-with thumbnails/graphics of Anne's discoveries at this new URL (Scott was forced to shut down the old site):
      http://tobaccofreedom.globalink.org/issues/documents/landman/


      Here are direct links to the docs:
    • Merry Christmas to the World from Philip Morris
    • Brown & Williamson: Sylvester Stallone Agrees to Use B&W Products in 5 Films for $500,000
    • Philip Morris: Ways to Disrupt the ASSIST Project
    • RJR: Youth Market
    • Tobacco Advisory Council: Response to Airline Smoking Ban on British Airways
    • Tobacco Institute: Aggression and Retribution to Combat Voluntary Clean Indoor Air Policies TI, Nov 22, 1989
        The tobacco industry designed and funded a highly intricate plot that they called "The Insurance Program," to bring public wrath and even a congressional investigation of "discriminatory practices" down upon the insurance industry after they started to offer non-smoker discounts.
    • Tobacco Institute: Clean Indoor Air Laws Reduce Tobacco Sales
    • Tobacco Institute: Laws That Restrict Where People Smoke Decrease Overall Smoking Rates
    • Tobacco Institute: Smoking More Addictive than Using Heroin, Hooking Two-Thirds the People Who Smoke
    • Tobacco Institute: Local Preemption Strategies to Derail Clean Indoor Air Legislation
    • Tobacco Institute: Plans to Defeating OSHA Attempts to Establish Standards for Secondhand Smoke
    • RJ Reynolds: Ways To Reach the Target -- Dakota Cigarettes Brainstorming
    • RJ Reynolds: Crack Smoking Monkeys Help Test New Cigarette
    • RJ Reynolds: Camel Cigarette Promotion and Marketing to Children
    • RJ Reynolds and Camel Cigarettes: Trend Influence Marketing
    • RJ Reynolds: Image Projection Among Young Smokers -- Perpetuating the Youth Market
    • RJ Reynolds: Less Educated Smokers -- How RJ Reynolds Characterizes Smokers
    • RJ Reynolds: Goody Goodies to Burnouts -- How RJ Reynolds Characterizes Smokers
    • RJ Reynolds: Secret Project Spa -- Attempts To Create a Safer Cigarette
    • RJ Reynolds: CONFIDENTIAL Product Research Report -- Share of Smokers by Age Group (includes 14-17s)
    • Philip Morris: We Found Radioactive Polonium-210 and Lead-210 in Our Cigarettes
    • Philip Morris: Chemistry of Kool Cigarettes -- Why They're Popular With Marijuana Smokers
    • Philip Morris: Auerbach's Smoking Beagles
    • Philip Morris Recognizes Carcinogens in Cigarette Smoke -- 1961
    • Philip Morris: Young Smokers, "The Daddy of Teenage Targeting Market Analysis"
         
    • Attachment A: Description of Data Sources (6 pages plus cover sheet)
         
    • Attachment B: Charts and Tables (17 Charts plus cover sheet)
    • Philip Morris: Nicotine May Be Responsible for Sudden Death in Cardiovascular Disease
    • Philip Morris: Top Secret Operation Rainmaker
    • Philip Morris: Trends in High School Smoking Prevalence
    • Philip Morris: Efforts to Confound Indoor Air Quality Using Alternative Strategies
    • 08/18/99 Philip Morris and the Ford Motor Company's Cardiovascular Intervention Program
        As to your offer to supply cigarettes to those in the program who find it hard or impossible to quit at reduced prices with varying levels of tar and nicotine, I believe that you have misunderstood the purpose of the program. The intent is not to provide volunteers with alternative ways of maintaining those habits which elevate ones probable risk of heart disease. Our goal is to extinguish such habits.
    • Philip Morris and the Relationship between Nicotine Content and Sales of Cigarettes
    • Philip Morris: Social-Political Context of Cigarette Sales and Use in the U.S. - 1987
    • Philip Morris: Addressing the Public Movement to Restrict/Prohibit Smoking in Public Places
    • Philip Morris: Federal Taxes and Reductions in Youth Smoking
    • Philip Morris: Cigarettes Are Addictive -- Smokers Act Like Any Drug Addict
    • Philip Morris: The Relationship of Nicotine Change and Sales Change in the Marlboro
    • Philip Morris: Manipulating Science About Secondhand (ETS) Smoke On a Global Basis
    • Philip Morris: Whitecoat Project: Scientists Hired to Manipulate Science On Secondhand (ETS) Smoke
    • Philip Morris: Dispute Findings of Scientific Papers "Damaging to Our Business"
    • Philip Morris: "Elevate the Criticism of EPA's Science on the ETS Risk Assessment"
    • Philip Morris: "Developing an Defensive Health Strategy (1961)"
    • Philip Morris: Implied Due Diligence in Product Testing
    • Philip Morris: Concerns About the Super-Lark, Permitting Satisfactory Pulmonary Clearance
    • Philip Morris: Strategy in 1980 California Smoking/No-Smoking Sections Initiative
    • Lorillard 1929 Advertisement: "Not a Cough in a Carload"
    • Lorillard: "Start 'em Out Young"
    • Lorillard: KENT Cigarettes -- The Myth Behind the "Safer Cigarette"
    • Lorillard: KENT Cigarettes -- "Stop to think... and you'll start to smoke KENT"
    • Lorillard: Project to Increase (Augment) the Nicotine in Cigarettes
    • Lorillard: 1978 U.S. Cigarette Sales VS. Nicotine
    • Lorillard: The Concept of Less Hazardous Cigarettes (1978)
    • Lorillard: 1993 Ballot Issues Budget Summary
    • Lorillard: Creating Doubt About the Health Charge Without Actually Denying It (1972)
    • Lorillard: Fumoaphobia Syndrome: Countering Social Cost Arguments Associated with Smoking
    • British American Tobacco (BAT): Providing "Adequate Dose of Nicotine to Maintain the Smoking Habit"



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      Anne Landman, Regional Program Coordinator
      American Lung Association of Colorado, West Region Office
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      (970) 245-2120
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